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“A WAIVER OF THE TRIAL ITSELF”: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL THREATS OF EXTENDING 
UNITED STATES v. MEZZANATTO AND 
CONTRACTUAL SOLUTIONS 
Abstract: Prosecutors and criminal defendants resolve most cases through plea 
agreements. Often these agreements contain waivers of Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(f) and Federal Rule of Evidence 410, which prevent the admission 
of statements made during plea discussions into evidence at criminal trial. In 
1995, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Mezzanatto held that such 
waivers are enforceable for impeachment purposes. Numerous U.S. Circuit 
Courts of Appeals have extended this holding by permitting the use of these 
statements for the prosecution’s rebuttal and case-in-chief. This Note asserts that 
the extension of Mezzanatto threatens the constitutional rights of criminal de-
fendants. It suggests that courts apply contract law principles to render waiver 
clauses unenforceable for rebuttal purposes and for the prosecution’s case-in-
chief because they are contrary to public policy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Dino Mitchell was barely able to read, had received very little formal ed-
ucation, and had no knowledge of the legal system.1 When a grand jury indict-
ed him for conspiracy to transport stolen securities along with several co-
conspirators, Mitchell opted to go to trial while the rest of his co-conspirators 
pled guilty.2 But on his trial date, Mitchell entered a plea agreement.3 This 
agreement included a clause that waived protections under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure (FRCP) 11(f) and Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 410.4 
                                                                                                                           
 1 United States v. Mitchell, 633 F.3d 997, 999 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 2 Id. Mitchell and his co-conspirators were charged with the crime of conspiracy to transport 
stolen goods. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2314 (codifying the crimes of conspiracy to commit an of-
fense or to defraud the United States, and transportation of stolen goods, securities, moneys, fraudu-
lent state tax stamps, or articles used in counterfeiting). A security is a financial tool that represents a 
monetary value, usually a stock or a bond. Will Kenton, Security, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 5, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/security.asp [https://perma.cc/LUT8-CFD5]. 
 3 Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 999. 
 4 Id. The agreement contained the following clause: 
[I]f I withdraw my plea of guilty, I shall assert no claim under . . . Rule 410 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . that 
the defendant’s statements pursuant to this agreement . . . should be suppressed or are 
inadmissible at any trial, hearing, or other proceeding. 
Id.; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f) (prohibiting guilty pleas and plea statements from being admitted into 
evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 410); FED. R. EVID. 410 (preventing the admission of 
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As a result of this waiver, any statements that Mitchell made during plea dis-
cussions would be admissible against him if the case ever went to trial.5 
After entering his guilty plea, Mitchell secured a new attorney and filed a 
motion to withdraw his plea, arguing that his former attorney had compelled 
him to plead guilty.6 The district court granted Mitchell’s motion and granted 
him a jury trial.7 Before the trial began, the government filed a motion in 
limine seeking to admit the statements that Mitchell had made during plea dis-
cussions for use in its presentation of evidence, or its “case-in-chief.”8 The 
court granted the government’s motion.9 The government relied heavily on 
Mitchell’s statements in its case.10 Its opening statement stressed that Mitchell 
had admitted to the offense under oath, and included portions from the plea 
colloquy in which Mitchell admitted to specific facts of the charge.11 The gov-
ernment went on to interrogate Mitchell about his guilty plea when he testified, 
                                                                                                                           
guilty pleas or plea statements into evidence). Mitchell also stated during the plea colloquy that he had 
pled guilty voluntarily. Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 999. Federal prosecutors commonly use these waivers. 
See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 216 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that waiver 
of the inadmissibility of plea discussions has become commonplace); Joseph S. Hall, Rule 11(e)(1)(C) 
and the Sentencing Guidelines: Bargaining Outside the Heartland?, 87 IOWA L. REV. 587, 600–01 
(2002) (noting the trend toward including FRE 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (FRCP) 
11(f) waivers).  
 5 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (according with FRE 410); FED. R. EVID. 410 (prohibiting the use of 
guilty pleas and plea statements as evidence); Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 999 (providing language from the 
waiver clause in Mitchell’s agreement). 
 6 Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 999. To withdraw a plea, a defendant must show a “fair and just reason” 
for doing so. Id. (first citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B); then citing United States v. Yazzie, 407 
F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc)). The district court denied Mitchell’s initial motion. Id. A 
week later, Mitchell filed a motion to reconsider in which he submitted two letters from his former 
attorney evincing coercion. Id. The first letter had been sent to Mitchell’s brother, instructing him to 
advise Mitchell to take the plea. Id. The second letter had been sent to Mitchell himself, highlighting 
the lower prison sentence he would be entitled to if he entered the plea agreement. Id. The letter ended 
with a note that Mitchell “would be a fool” not to accept the plea deal. Id. 
 7 See id. (stating that the constitutional right to a jury trial outweighed other considerations). 
 8 Id. at 1000. A motion in limine is a motion that occurs before trial and seeks to determine 
whether a piece of evidence will be admissible at trial. Robert E. Bacharach, Motions in Limine in 
Oklahoma State and Federal Courts, 24 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 113, 114 (1999). In its motion, the 
prosecution referred to Mitchell’s waiver of FRE 410. Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1000. Mitchell opposed 
the prosecution’s motion, arguing that the use of his statements violated FRE 403. Id.; see FED. R. 
EVID. 403 (excluding evidence that is more prejudicial than probative). A case-in-chief encompasses 
all the evidence introduced from when the party presents its first witness to the point at which that 
party rests its case. Case-in-chief, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). By contrast, parties 
use rebuttal evidence to refute or to counter the opposing party’s evidence. Id. at Rebuttal Evidence. 
 9 Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1000. The court extended the rationale of United States v. Mezzanatto, 
which allowed plea statements to be used for impeachment purposes. See id. (stating that the rationale 
in Mezzanatto applied to the use of plea statements for the prosecution’s case-in-chief). 
 10 See id. (highlighting the government’s use of statements from the plea agreement and plea 
colloquy at trial). 
 11 Id. 
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and also referred to his guilty plea in its closing argument.12 The jury convicted 
Mitchell and sentenced him to twenty-seven months in prison followed by thir-
ty-six months of supervised release.13 
Mitchell’s case likely would have played out differently in other federal 
courts.14 If the Supreme Court had reviewed this case after its United States v. 
Mezzanatto decision, the Court would have allowed Mitchell’s plea statements 
to come into evidence only if he personally had testified contrary to his prior 
statements.15 If Mitchell’s case came before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit today, his statements would have been allowed in for rebuttal 
purposes, meaning that they would be admitted if he presented a defense that 
contradicted his prior statements.16 But before the Tenth Circuit, Mitchell’s 
breach of his plea agreement triggered the use of his statements for the prose-
cution’s case-in-chief.17 Without direction from the Supreme Court, this lack 
of clarity between the circuit courts as to how prosecutors with valid FRE 410 
waivers may use plea statements leads to vastly different outcomes for similar-
ly situated defendants.18 
Like Mitchell, most criminal defendants enter plea agreements with the 
government rather than risking the uncertainty of a jury trial.19 Congress en-
                                                                                                                           
 12 Id. A plea colloquy is a discussion between the defendant and the judge that must occur before 
the defendant pleads guilty. Danielle M. Lang, Note, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Effect of Plea Colloquy 
Warnings on Defendants’ Ability to Bring Successful Padilla Claims, 121 YALE L.J. 944, 944 (2012). 
The Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause require this conversa-
tion. Id. During the plea colloquy, the judge issues warnings, which inform the defendant of any im-
migration implications and affirm that the defendant is choosing to waive his or her right to a trial. Id. 
 13 Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1000. 
 14 See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 199, 210 (holding that plea statements can be used for impeach-
ment purposes); Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1006 (determining that plea statements can be used for the gov-
ernment’s case-in-chief); United States v. Newbert, 504 F.3d 180, 181, 183 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding 
that the defendant did not breach his plea agreement in a case in which the defendant withdrew his 
guilty plea after evidence of his innocence came to light); United States v. Rebbe, 314 F.3d 402, 408–
09 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that plea statements can be used for rebuttal purposes); United States v. 
Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (enforcing a plea waiver that allowed for plea statements 
to be used in the government’s case-in-chief). 
 15 See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204–05, 210 (enforcing plea waiver for impeachment purposes 
only). 
 16 See Rebbe, 314 F.3d at 402, 408–09 (admitting statements to rebut testimony, evidence, and 
arguments presented at trial). 
 17 See Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1006 (allowing the use of plea waivers for the prosecution’s case-in-
chief). 
 18 See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 217 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for failing to 
address the likely expansion of its holding to case-in-chief waivers, and stating that a case-in-chief 
waiver is effectively the waiver of a trial). Compare Mitchell, 633 F.3d at 1000 (holding that case-in-
chief waivers are enforceable), and Burch, 156 F.3d at 1321 (same), with Rebbe, 314 F.3d at 402, 
408–09 (allowing plea statements to be used for rebuttal purposes). 
 19 See John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most Who Do Are 
Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/
11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/ [https://perma.
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courages these agreements because they promote efficiency and save judicial 
resources.20 They also often provide defendants with more favorable sentenc-
es.21 These agreements frequently include provisions that require defendants to 
waive certain rights.22 Although FRE 410 and FRCP 11(f) were designed to 
prevent statements made during plea discussions from being admitted as evi-
dence at trial, prosecutors are increasingly including clauses that explicitly 
waive these protections.23 In 1995, the Supreme Court in Mezzanatto held that 
waivers of FRE 410 and FRCP 11(f) are enforceable for impeachment purpos-
es.24 Circuit courts have extended this reading to allow prosecutors to admit 
plea statements into evidence for rebuttal and case-in-chief.25 This expansion 
of Mezzanatto threatens the constitutional rights of defendants and the plea-
bargaining system at large.26 
Part I of this Note examines the formation of plea agreements as contracts, 
provides background on the waiver clauses in those agreements, and discusses 
the seminal case on the subject, Mezzanatto.27 Part II explores the various ap-
proaches that circuit courts have taken in their interpretations of the Mezzanatto 
decision, ranging from a refusal to enforce FRE 410 waivers, to the allowance of 
statements for rebuttal purposes, to the acceptance of the use of plea statements 
                                                                                                                           
cc/WE8N-WU7R] (stating that, in 2018, only 2% of criminal defendants went to trial, 90% of crimi-
nal defendants pleaded guilty, and the federal government dismissed the remaining 8% of cases). 
 20 See United States v. Mezzanatto (Mezzanatto I), 998 F.2d 1452, 1455 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d, 
513 U.S. 196 (noting that the policy rationale behind the encouragement of plea agreements is to fos-
ter efficiency and to conserve judicial resources). 
 21 Joel Mallord, Comment, Putting Plea Bargaining on the Record, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 683, 688 
(2014). Because prosecutors wish to avoid the time and expense of trial, they incentivize defendants to 
enter plea agreements by offering more lenient sentences. Id. This can be done by offering not to bring 
additional charges, dropping existing ones, or by recommending a specific sentence range to the court. 
Id. 
 22 Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1909 
(1992). These rights include the right to testify on one’s own behalf, the right to a jury trial, and the 
right to an appeal. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (listing defendant’s waivable rights); 
see also, e.g., United States v. Smith, 500 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that a waiver of 
the right to appeal in a plea agreement is enforceable); United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 863 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (same). 
 23 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (complying with FRE 410); FED. R. EVID. 410 (prohibiting the admis-
sion of guilty pleas and plea statements into evidence); Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 216 (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (stating FRE 410 and FRCP 11(e)(6) waivers have become commonplace). 
 24 513 U.S. at 204–05, 210. 
 25 See id. (holding that waivers allowing the use of plea statements for impeachment purposes are 
valid); see also, e.g., United States v. Rebbe, 314 F.3d 402, 408–09 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing the use 
of plea statements for rebuttal purposes); United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (allowing plea statements to be used for the government’s case-in-chief). 
 26 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (ensuring the right to a fair trial); Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 211 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (expressing concern that the use of plea statements for the government’s 
case-in-chief could discourage defendants from entering into plea bargains). 
 27 See infra notes 30–142 and accompanying text. 
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for the government’s case-in-chief.28 Part III argues that an expansive reading of 
Mezzanatto infringes upon the right of criminal defendants to a fair trial and, 
accordingly, proposes reform based in contract principles.29 
I. THE BASICS OF PLEA AGREEMENTS, CONTRACTS, AND WAIVERS 
A defendant facing a criminal charge has two options: face the uncertainty 
of a jury trial, or plead guilty.30 Most defendants choose the latter.31 But why 
do defendants make that decision?32 What happens to defendants who enter 
guilty pleas and then change their minds?33 
This Part provides background information on defendants’ constitutional 
right to a fair trial, describes the mechanics of plea agreement withdrawals, 
and frames plea agreements as contracts.34 It also examines Mezzanatto, the 
seminal case on waiver clauses in plea agreements.35 Section A of this Part out-
lines defendants’ right to a fair trial.36 Section B discusses the mechanics of 
plea agreement withdrawals, the specific rules of evidence and criminal proce-
dure that are essential to the plea agreement system, and the legislative intent 
behind these rules.37 Section C examines how contracts of adhesion relate to 
plea agreements under general contract principles.38 Section D defines waiver 
clauses and explores their prevalence in federal plea agreements.39 It further 
reviews the factual and procedural history of the Supreme Court’s 1995 Mez-
zanatto decision, which upheld the enforceability of waiver clauses in plea 
agreements for impeachment purposes.40 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See infra notes 143–240 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 241–318 and accompanying text. 
 30 Gramlich, supra note 19. A defendant also can enter a nolo contendere plea, meaning that the 
defendant accepts punishment as though he or she is guilty without an admission of guilt. Stephanos 
Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford 
and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1363 (2003). 
 31 See Gramlich, supra note 19 (stating that ninety percent of criminal defendants pleaded guilty). 
 32 See Earl G. Penrod, The Guilty Plea Process in Indiana: A Proposal to Strengthen the Dimin-
ishing Factual Basis Requirement, 34 IND. L. REV. 1127, 1141 n.64 (2001) (listing reasons as to why 
criminal defendants may plead guilty). There are several reasons an innocent defendant may choose to 
plead guilty. Id. These reasons include: the desire to get a good deal from the prosecutor, the hope for 
a reduced sentence from a judge, the fear engendered by the uncertainty and expense of a jury trial, 
and the lack of understanding of what it means to plead guilty. Id. Moreover, defendants may enter 
plea agreements to avoid convictions for other crimes for which they are guilty. Id. 
 33 See, e.g., United States v. Newbert, 504 F.3d 180, 181, 183 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that the 
defendant did not breach a plea in a case where the defendant withdrew his guilty plea after evidence 
of his innocence surfaced). 
 34 See infra notes 30–142 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 30–142 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 41–46 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 47–65 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 66–91 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 92–142 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 92–142 and accompanying text. 
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A. Defendants’ Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial 
The right to a fair trial is one of American citizens’ most important enti-
tlements.41 The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides criminal 
defendants with certain trial rights, including the right to a speedy public trial 
in front of an impartial jury of their peers, the right to confront the witnesses 
against them, and the right to counsel.42 The right to counsel includes the as-
surance of a competent defense.43 All courts consider that right to hinge entire-
ly on the aptitude of the defendant’s attorney.44 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See Sarah Podmaniczky, Note, Order in the Court: Decorum, Rambunctious Defendants, and 
the Right to Be Present at Trial, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1283, 1289 (2012) (characterizing the right to 
a fair trial as “the most fundamental of all freedoms” (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 
(1965))). 
 42 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to a “speedy trial” is still somewhat ill-defined. Lewis Le-
Naire, Comment, Vermont v. Brillon: Public Defense and the Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy 
Trial, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 219, 221 (2010). The Supreme Court has stated that the inquiry as to 
whether the “speedy trial” provision has been violated is very fact-specific, and that lower courts 
should find a violation only when the delay is intentional or unjust. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 
354, 361 (1957). The purpose of the clause is to prevent excessive incarceration before trial and to 
ensure that defendants can more ably defend themselves. LeNaire, supra, at 221–22 (quoting United 
States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966)). The right to a trial before an impartial jury is designed to pro-
tect criminal defendants from overreaching prosecutors and biased judges. Evan G. Hall, Note, The 
House Always Wins: Systemic Disadvantage for Criminal Defendants and the Case Against the Pros-
ecutorial Veto, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1717, 1719 (2017). The right of defendants to confront the wit-
nesses against them allows defendants to hear the testimony against them and to impeach that testi-
mony through cross-examination. Pamela R. Metzger, Confrontation as a Rule of Production, 24 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 995, 998 (2016). The right to counsel minimizes the state’s advantage over 
criminal defendants that are lay persons and unfamiliar with the law by allowing for, and in some 
cases providing, an advocate to represent them at criminal proceedings. Brooks Holland, A Relational 
Sixth Amendment During Interrogation, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 388 (2009). 
 43 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing the right to counsel); Stephen G. Gilles, Comment, 
Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1380, 1385–86 (1983) (stating that courts have interpreted the Sixth Amendment as ensuring the 
right to a competent defense). 
 44 Gilles, supra note 43, at 1385–86. Most courts view the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel as 
implying the right to competent counsel, but defendants are entitled to a new trial only if they can 
prove that the incompetence of counsel prejudiced them. Id. at 1386; see, e.g., Scott v. United States, 
427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (requiring that the defendant show how the incompetence of his 
attorney had a prejudicial effect on the defendant’s case). The only circuit courts that have not taken 
this approach are the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits. Gilles, supra note 43, at 1385 n.27. The 
Fourth and Sixth Circuits require a showing of prejudice and will grant a new trial only if incompe-
tence is shown. Id. at 1399–1400; see Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1968) (holding that 
if the defendant’s counsel is found to be incompetent, the court must grant a new trial); Beasley v. 
United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696–97 (6th Cir. 1974) (same). The Second Circuit requires the defense 
to show that, because of counsel’s incompetence, the defendant did not receive a fair trial in violation 
of the Due Process Clause. Gilles, supra note 43, at 1408. 
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Sixth Amendment rights protect defendants from arbitrary or unjust gov-
ernment conduct and uphold the impartiality of the criminal justice system.45 Alt-
hough the right to a fair trial is a constitutional guarantee, that right is waivable.46 
B. The Mechanics of Plea Agreements 
Most criminal cases do not go to trial, but instead conclude in a plea 
agreement.47 In 2012, the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Frye acknowledged 
that plea bargaining “is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is 
the criminal justice system.”48 
In a typical plea agreement, the prosecutor agrees to pursue a lesser sen-
tence or to drop certain charges.49 Through this bargain, the defendant foregoes 
the uncertainty of trial in return for a more lenient sentence, while the prosecu-
                                                                                                                           
 45 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (stating that fair trial rights protect defend-
ants against arbitrary applications of the law); Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960) 
(“[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 
(1954))). 
 46 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (holding that defendants may waive con-
stitutional rights as conditions of entering plea bargains). In Brady v. United States, Robert M. Brady 
was charged with kidnapping and faced the death penalty. Id. at 743. Represented by competent coun-
sel, Brady initially chose to plead not guilty. Id. When he discovered that his co-defendant had pled 
guilty and would be able to testify against him, Brady entered a guilty plea. Id. The trial judge ques-
tioned Brady twice about the voluntariness of his plea before accepting it. Id. Brady was sentenced to 
fifty years in prison, which eventually was shortened to thirty years. Id. at 744. Brady appealed, claim-
ing that his plea was not made voluntarily because of the coerciveness of a prospective death penalty 
and because his attorney had pressured him to enter the agreement, given the significant sentence 
reduction that Brady would receive if he pled guilty. Id. The court ultimately held that Brady’s waiver 
of a jury trial was valid because he had entered the agreement knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 748. 
 47 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1909; Gramlich, supra note 19. The number of criminal de-
fendants who choose to go to trial has fallen by sixty percent over the past twenty years. Gramlich, 
supra note 19. Some speculate that this decline in trials is a result of the so-called “trial penalty,” in 
which defendants who exercise their right to a trial face much higher penalties. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. 
DEF. LAWS., THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EX-
TINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 5 (2018), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-
9115-520b3f58036a/the-trial-penalty-the-sixth-amendment-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-extinction-and-
how-to-save-it.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W7G-HWQT]. 
 48 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (quoting Scott & Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1912). In Missouri v. Frye, 
the state charged Frye with driving with a revoked license—a crime that he had been convicted of 
three times before. Id. at 138. Frye’s three prior convictions resulted in a felony charge that carried a 
maximum prison term of four years. Id. The prosecutor sent the defendant’s attorney a letter with two 
plea offers. Id. The first offer was a three-year sentence with ten days of jail time if Frye pled guilty. 
Id. The other offer included reducing the charge to a misdemeanor and a ninety-day prison sentence. 
Id. at 138–39. The defendant’s attorney never conveyed either offer to his client, causing both of them 
to expire. Id. at 139. Right before his trial, the defendant was arrested again for driving with a revoked 
license. Id. He pled guilty without an underlying plea agreement and was sentenced to three years in 
prison. Id. Frye appealed the decision, stating that he would have taken one of the original plea offers 
had his attorney informed him of their existence. Id. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to competent counsel applies to lapsed plea agreements and remanded the case. Id. 
at 144, 151; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that criminal defendants have the right to counsel). 
 49 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1909 (describing the mechanics of most plea bargains). 
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tor avoids the time and expense of trial.50 By pleading guilty, defendants not 
only admit guilt, but also waive their right to a trial before a judge or jury.51 
FRCP 11 governs the process for entering plea agreements.52 This Rule 
requires the court to question defendants about whether they entered the plea 
knowingly and voluntarily, and to advise defendants of the rights that they 
waive by pleading guilty.53 The court may accept the plea, reject the plea, or 
postpone its decision until it assesses the presentence report.54 A defendant can 
withdraw a plea before the court has accepted it for any reason.55 After the 
court accepts a guilty plea, it can exercise its discretion and allow a defendant 
to withdraw the plea if the defendant provides a just reason for doing so.56 Alt-
hough this standard is flexible, defendants may not withdraw guilty pleas on a 
whim, nor may they do so after sentencing.57 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Mallord, supra note 21, at 688. 
 51 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting criminal defendants the right to a “speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury”); Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (holding that defendants can waive constitutional 
rights as conditions of entering plea bargains). 
 52 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. The advisory committee created Rule 11 of the FRCP to protect defend-
ants’ fundamental rights when pleading guilty. Kristen N. Sinisi, Comment, The Cheney Dilemma: 
Should a Defendant Be Allowed to Appeal the Factual Basis of His Conviction After Entering an Un-
conditional Guilty Plea?, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 1171, 1175–76 (2010). By pleading guilty, a defendant 
waives the right to a trial, the right to confront witnesses against them, and the protection from self-
incrimination. Id. at 1177. 
 53 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). Brady defines the two-pronged test for enforceable plea agreements. 
397 U.S. at 755–56. A plea is considered to be voluntary if it is not the result of threats, untrue state-
ments, or based on empty promises. Id. at 755. Defendants “voluntarily and intelligently” enter pleas 
when they are aware of the circumstances and consequences of their actions. Id. at 758. Despite this 
standard, criminal defendants often enter guilty pleas without sufficient judicial examination of their 
understanding of the result of the plea, or whether the plea was voluntary. Julian A. Cook III, Federal 
Guilty Pleas: Inequities, Indigence, and the Rule 11 Process, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1073, 1076 (2019). 
 54 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A). A presentence report gives details of the defendant’s educational, 
family, social, and criminal history. Presentence-Investigation Report, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 8. A probation officer prepares the presentence report and gives it to the judge to help 
determine the defendant’s sentence. Id. 
 55 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(1); see, e.g., United States v. Lord, 915 F.3d 1009, 1013 (5th Cir. 2019) 
(rejecting defendants’ attempted plea withdrawal for conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money ser-
vicing business, after the defendants realized that they did not require a license for the type of business 
they were operating); United States v. Wallace, 276 F.3d 360, 363 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing a de-
fendant who unsuccessfully tried to withdraw his guilty plea after discovering that he was being held 
responsible for more than he initially thought); United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343 (5th Cir. 
1984) (enforcing the defendants’ guilty plea after the defendants discovered a defense that they did 
not know was available to them at the time of pleading). 
 56 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B); United States v. McTiernan, 546 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 
2008), aff’d, 552 F. App’x 749 (9th Cir. 2014). “Fair and just” reasons to withdraw a plea include 
insufficient plea instructions, new evidence, and unforeseen circumstances. United States v. Ortega-
Ascanio, 376 F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 57 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e) (stating that pleas may not be withdrawn after sentencing); 
McTiernan, 546 F.3d at 1167 (noting that courts construe the standard for whether a plea may be 
withdrawn liberally); United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676 (1997) (stating that pleas may not be 
withdrawn on a whim). 
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At trial, FRCP 11(f) states that FRE 410 governs the admissibility of plea 
agreements and statements.58 FRE 410 renders withdrawn guilty pleas and 
statements made during plea discussions inadmissible.59 There are, however, 
two exceptions.60 Statements made during plea discussions that result in a later 
plea withdrawal may be admissible if: (1) the court admitted another statement 
made during the plea discussions and fairness requires that the court also admit 
the statement in question, or (2) in a criminal proceeding for perjury and the 
defendant made the statement under oath.61 
The advisory committee notes to FRE 410 explain the rationale behind ex-
cluding withdrawn guilty pleas from evidence by citing to the Supreme Court’s 
landmark 1927 decision in Kercheval v. United States.62 In Kercheval, the Court 
held that admitting a withdrawn plea into evidence would be inconsistent with 
the decision to grant the defendant a trial because a jury may interpret a prior 
guilty plea as an admission of guilt.63 Courts exclude statements made during 
                                                                                                                           
 58 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f); see FED. R. EVID. 410 (excluding evidence of plea agreements and plea 
discussions at trial). In 2002, the advisory committee amended the FRCP to create the current form of 
FRCP 11(f). FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e) advisory committee’s notes to 2002 amendment. Rule 11(e)(6), 
which formerly governed plea statements, barred the use of prior guilty pleas, nolo contendere pleas, and 
statements made during plea discussions as evidence in criminal trials. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6); U.S. 
Dep’t Just., Justice Manual, Criminal Resource Manual § 627, https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-
resource-manual-627-inadmissibility-pleas-federal-rule-criminal-procedure-11e6 [https://perma.cc/
YW9R-9A5U] (last updated Jan. 22, 2020). A nolo contendere plea admits guilt for all purposes of the 
current case. Nolo Contendere Plea, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8. All of these provi-
sions have been subsequently incorporated into FRE 410, so the substance of the Rule has not 
changed. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f) (stating that FRE 410 governs the admissibility of plea agree-
ments and statements); FED. R. EVID. 410 (prohibiting the admission of withdrawn plea agreements 
and plea discussions). Because some of the cases discussed in this Note occurred before the 2002 
change, FRCP 11(e)(6) will be mentioned throughout this Note. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanat-
to, 513 U.S. 196, 197 (1995) (referring to FRCP 11(e)(6) because the case occurred before the 2002 
amendment). 
 59 FED. R. EVID. 410(a)(1), (4). 
 60 Id. R. 410(b). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. R. 410 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules; Kercheval v. United States, 274 
U.S. 220, 224 (1927). The intent behind FRE 410(b)(1) was similar to the rationale underlying FRE 
106, which provides that if a court admits a written or recorded statement into evidence, the opposing 
party may request to obtain any other part of the writing or recording that fairness requires. Colin 
Miller, The Best Offense Is a Good Defense: Why Criminal Defendants’ Nolo Contendere Pleas 
Should Be Inadmissible Against Them When They Become Civil Plaintiffs, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 725, 
734 (2006). Both rules prevent parties from using the rules defensively when they introduce state-
ments being used offensively. Id. at 734–35. An advisory committee is a committee formed to make 
suggestions to legislative bodies on appellate, bankruptcy, civil, criminal, and evidence rules. Adviso-
ry Committee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8. The advisory committee for the FRE in-
cludes attorneys, law professors, federal judges, state chief justices, and members of the Department 
of Justice. Federal Court Rules Research Guide, GEO. L. LIBR., https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/c.
php?g=320799&p=2146449 [https://perma.cc/8BQQ-L7XX]. 
 63 274 U.S. at 224–25. In Kercheval, the defendant pled guilty to mail fraud and was sentenced to 
three years in prison. Id. at 221. The defendant filed a petition alleging that the prosecutor had prom-
ised to recommend a three-month sentence and a one-thousand-dollar fine, and that the court had 
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plea discussions to foster candid communication between defendants and prose-
cutors, and to encourage plea agreements.64 The advisory committee notes to 
FRCP 11(f) also state that the Rule is meant to promote plea agreements.65 
C. General Principles of Contracts and Plea Agreements as Contracts 
Parties form a contract when there is an offer, acceptance, and considera-
tion.66 Not all agreements that fulfill these requirements, however, are enforce-
able contracts.67 A contract is unenforceable on public policy grounds when 
legislation renders it unenforceable, or when justifications not to enforce the 
contract plainly outweigh the reasons to enforce it.68 When deciding whether 
public policy outweighs the reasons to enforce specific contract terms, courts 
consider: (1) the policy itself and whether legislative or judicial decisions sup-
port that policy; (2) whether not enforcing the term would support that policy; 
(3) whether there was intentional wrongdoing involved in the making of the 
agreement; and (4) the connection between that wrongdoing and the term it-
self.69 A court’s finding that a specific term is unenforceable does not neces-
                                                                                                                           
agreed to adopt the recommendation. Id. The court upheld the sentence, but allowed the defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea and granted him a new trial. Id. At the new trial, the district court allowed the 
prosecution to introduce evidence of the original guilty plea as part of its case-in-chief. Id. at 221–22. 
The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
verdict. Id. The Supreme Court, however, overturned the Eighth Circuit’s ruling, and held that the 
guilty plea was inadmissible because the court’s decision to allow the guilty plea to be withdrawn was 
inconsistent with its decision to grant the defendant a new trial. Id. at 225. 
 64 FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules; see People v. Hamilton, 
383 P.2d 412, 416 (Cal. 1963) (explaining that the purpose of legislative changes to the admissibility 
of plea statements was rooted in encouraging plea agreements), overruled by People v. Morse, 388 
P.2d 33 (Cal. 1964). 
 65 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to 1979 amendment. 
 66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981). An offer is a statement 
that conveys that one party is willing to give or do something for another party. Offer, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 8. A party accepts an offer when that party expresses assent to the offeror. 
Id. at Acceptance. Consideration is something bargained for that a promisee gives to a promisor. Id. at 
Consideration. 
 67 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (stating that contracts that violate public 
policy are unenforceable). 
 68 Id. § 178(1); see, e.g., Kardoh v. United States, 572 F.3d 697, 699–700 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that a contract between a Syrian national and an undercover federal agent in which forty thousand 
dollars were exchanged for alien registration cards, during a sting operation, was unenforceable be-
cause the contract was illegal); Dubey v. Pub. Storage, Inc., 918 N.E.2d 265, 275–76 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2009) (holding that a rental agreement that limited the liability of a storage company to five thousand 
dollars for loss or damage of property was unenforceable because it violated the Landlord and Tenant 
Act); Ron Medlin Constr. v. Harris, 681 S.E.2d 807, 810–11 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a 
contract between a general contractor and individuals for whom he had built a home was unenforcea-
ble because the contractor was not licensed), aff’d, 704 S.E.2d 486 (N.C. 2010). 
 69 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. § 178(3) (listing the factors to consider when 
deciding whether to void a term on public policy grounds). 
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sarily render the entire agreement void.70 The blue pencil doctrine allows 
courts to enforce the contract’s reasonable terms and to disregard or remove 
the unreasonable terms.71 
Because a plea agreement includes an offer, an acceptance, and considera-
tion, plea agreements are contracts.72 In plea agreements, a prosecutor offers to 
pursue a lesser sentence or to drop certain charges, and the defendant accepts 
this offer by agreeing to plead guilty.73 Therefore, when a defendant or prose-
cutor breaches a plea agreement, courts will apply principles of contract law.74 
Plea agreements are rarely negotiable.75 Most often the prosecutor—the 
party with the most bargaining power—presents a boilerplate agreement that 
the defendant can either accept or decline.76 This “take it or leave it” form of 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See id. § 184 (stating that a court may enforce the remainder of an agreement when a term in 
the agreement violates public policy). 
 71 See Jak Prods., Inc. v. Wiza, 986 F.2d 1080, 1087 (7th Cir. 1993) (modifying a non-competition 
agreement by narrowing the terms). Courts follow the blue pencil test by determining whether they 
can remove unenforceable language—crossing it out with a blue pencil—without rearranging or modi-
fying the original intent of the contract. Blue Pencil Test, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8. 
Drafters frequently employ the blue pencil doctrine in the context of non-competition agreements. 
Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for Specificity in Noncompete 
Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 673–74 (2008). Some scholars are critical of the doctrine because it 
violates contract principles, in that it allows for the creation of a new contract to which the parties did 
not agree. Id. at 674. 
 72 United States v. Henry, 758 F.3d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see Puckett v. United States, 556 
U.S. 129, 137 (2009) (stating that plea agreements are basically contracts and thus contract principles 
govern them). 
 73 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (stating that a prosecutor’s promise 
qualified as consideration); Henry, 758 F.3d at 431 (evaluating a plea agreement using contract prin-
ciples). 
 74 Henry, 758 F.3d at 431; see United States v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (apply-
ing contract law to a plea agreement). In 1995, in United States v. Jones, the D.C. Circuit applied 
contract principles to a plea agreement. 58 F.3d at 691. The case centered on defendant Otis Jones, 
who had agreed to plead guilty to mail theft by a postal employee and forgery of a U.S. Treasury 
check. Id. at 689–90. In the agreement, Jones consented to a guilty plea, the payment of restitution, 
and to aid in the government’s investigation of others involved in Jones’s plan. Id. at 690. The gov-
ernment agreed not to prosecute Jones for any other financial crimes related to his employment at the 
U.S. Postal Service, to inform the judge responsible for sentencing him of his cooperation in the gov-
ernment’s investigation, and not to object to a lesser sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. Id. The government also promised to ask the court to reduce Jones’s prison sentence. Id. When 
the time came, the government did not recommend a lesser sentence because the government did not 
think that Jones’s cooperation with the investigation was substantial enough. Id. Although the district 
court judge expressed discomfort with the government’s behavior, he enforced the plea agreement. Id. 
at 690–91. The contract’s plain language stated that the government’s promises would be fulfilled if a 
committee determined that Jones had substantially assisted the government. Id. at 691. Thus, the con-
tract specifically contemplated that the government had the discretion to decide whether the defendant 
had fulfilled his end of the bargain. Id. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling. Id. at 692. 
 75 See United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that a plea agreement is an 
adhesion contract). 
 76 See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 216 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that 
prosecutors often use standard forms for plea agreements). 
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contract is called a contract of adhesion.77 A contract of adhesion is a contract 
that a party must accept or deny in its entirety with no possibility of negotia-
tion.78 Courts regularly enforce contracts of adhesion; however, judges are 
more likely to scrutinize and intervene in a contract of adhesion than a tradi-
tional contract because by nature contracts of adhesion are susceptible to pro-
cedural unconscionability.79 
For a contract to qualify as a contract of adhesion, it must involve a 
standard form and non-negotiable terms.80 The party in the stronger negotiat-
ing position almost always drafts an adhesion contract, leaving the weaker par-
ty little choice but to sign or forfeit the agreement entirely.81 Hospital bills, 
consumer credit card agreements, mortgage-lending forms, and retail return 
policies are all common forms of adhesion contracts where the adherent has no 
opportunity to negotiate the terms of the agreement.82 
Some scholars argue that contracts of adhesion should not be enforced 
because submission to non-negotiated terms does not fulfill the fundamental 
voluntariness requirement for contract validity.83 Others support the enforce-
ment of adhesion contracts because they reduce transaction costs and promote 
efficiency, but argue that courts should not enforce “unreasonable or indecent” 
terms.84 Although courts enforce adhesion contracts routinely, if the terms are 
unjust to the weaker bargaining party, then a court will find such contracts un-
conscionable and consequently unenforceable.85 
                                                                                                                           
 77 Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28 YALE J. 
REG. 313, 346 (2011). 
 78 Id. 
 79 See Steven W. Feldman, Mutual Assent, Normative Degradation, and Mass Market Standard 
Form Contracts—A Two-Part Critique of Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights and the Rule 
of Law (Part I), 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 435 (2014) (stating that judges often enforce contracts of 
adhesion); Schwartz, supra note 77, at 355 (identifying that judges are more likely to intervene in a 
contract of adhesion). 
 80 Schwartz, supra note 77, at 346. 
 81 Id.; see Adhesion Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8 (defining an adhesion 
contract as a standard form contract that a weaker party signs with no ability to negotiate the terms). 
 82 Feldman, supra note 79, at 386–87. Click-wrap contracts have become increasingly common as 
a result of the internet’s development. Zachary M. Harrison, Note, Just Click Here: Article 2B’s Fail-
ure to Guarantee Adequate Manifestation of Assent in Click-Wrap Contracts, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 907, 908 (1998). Click-wrap contracts involve an offer of terms that appear 
on a computer screen. Id. at 909. Consumers accept by clicking a box indicating that they accept those 
terms. Id. There are usually only two options—accept or decline—and there is no opportunity for the 
consumer to negotiate terms. Id. at 912. 
 83 Schwartz, supra note 77, at 351. Because contracts of adhesion are nonnegotiable, a party that 
signs such a contract cannot voluntarily assent to the terms as if entering into a bargained-for agree-
ment. Id. 
 84 Id. at 351–52, 353. 
 85 See THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Spradlin, 532 F. App’x 813, 818 (10th Cir. 2013) (not-
ing that contracts are unconscionable when they are clearly unjust to the weaker party); Feldman, 
supra note 79, at 435 (stating that courts will opt to enforce adhesion contracts unless there is a clear 
bargaining imbalance). 
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Plea agreements possess many of the characteristics of potentially unjust 
contracts of adhesion.86 Prosecutors’ offices use boilerplate form contracts for 
plea agreements, which today consistently include FRE 410 and FRCP 11(f) 
waivers.87 There is a clear imbalance of power between prosecutors and crimi-
nal defendants.88 Prosecutors draft the agreements and thus determine the 
terms, and are often in a position to bring additional charges or suggest a long-
er sentence.89 Criminal defendants face the potential loss of their freedom, and 
are therefore inclined to enter plea agreements with unfavorable terms.90 De-
spite this power imbalance, courts have upheld these agreements as long as the 
government does not abuse its power and the defendants enter the agreements 
knowingly and voluntarily, and thus rarely intervene to prevent enforcement.91 
D. The Enforceability of Waiver Clauses in Plea Agreements 
Commercial contracts often include waiver clauses that require one party 
to give up a specific privilege, such as the right to a jury trial in the event of a 
civil dispute.92 Similarly, prosecutors often include waiver clauses in plea 
agreements.93 A defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of certain constitu-
tional and statutory rights makes plea agreements possible and enforceable.94 
For example, inherent to a plea agreement is the defendant’s waiver of their 
constitutional right to a jury trial.95 Waivers of the right to appeal convictions 
and sentencing orders also have become commonplace in plea agreements.96 
                                                                                                                           
 86 See United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that a plea agreement 
constituted an acceptable contract of adhesion because the defendant had the choice not to enter the 
agreement if it was too unfavorable); Michael D. Cicchini, Broken Government Promises: A Contract-
Based Approach to Enforcing Plea Bargains, 38 N.M. L. REV. 159, 170 (2008) (noting that even in 
cases of clear prosecutorial misconduct, courts are still likely to uphold plea agreements). 
 87 See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 216 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that 
prosecutors frequently include FRE 410 waivers in their standard form plea agreement contracts). 
 88 Id.; Matt Cross, Note, The Search for Consistency: The Interpretation of Plea Agreements and 
Appeal Waivers in the Face of Breach, 15 J.L. SOC’Y 119, 140 (2013). 
 89 Cross, supra note 88, at 143. 
 90 See id. (describing the process of prosecutors railroading criminal defendants into plea agree-
ments by threatening to bring more charges or seek harsher sentences). 
 91 See, e.g., Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 367 (7th Cir. 1999) (refusing to 
void a contract between parties of unequal bargaining power, even though the court found that there 
was no possibility of negotiation). 
 92 See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waiv-
ers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 167 (2004) (discussing the waiver of 
jury trials and arbitration clauses). Such contracts also frequently include arbitration clauses that re-
quire the parties to forego the court system entirely in favor of private arbitration. Id. at 169. 
 93 Id. at 181. A waiver is a possessor’s chosen abandonment of a known right. Waiver, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8. 
 94 See, e.g., Allied Ir. Banks v. Bank of Am., N.A., 875 F. Supp. 2d 352, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(discussing the waiver of the right to a jury trial). 
 95 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (holding that defendants can waive con-
stitutional rights as conditions of plea bargains); Alexandra W. Reimelt, Note, An Unjust Bargain: 
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Additionally, plea agreements frequently feature a waiver of FRE 410 and 
FRCP 11(f).97 These waivers allow the prosecution to use statements made 
during plea discussions at trial if the defendant breaches the agreement.98 For 
many years, circuit courts disagreed on the validity of such waivers.99 
In Mezzanatto, the Supreme Court finally addressed the circuit split as to 
whether criminal defendants could waive the inadmissibility of plea agree-
ments under FRCP 11(e)(6) and FRE 410.100 In 1991, police arrested Gary 
Mezzanatto and charged him with possession of methamphetamine with intent 
                                                                                                                           
Plea Bargains and the Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 51 B.C. L. REV. 871, 876 (2010) (stating that 
appeal waivers have become increasingly common). 
 96 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 500 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that a waiver of 
the right to appeal in a plea agreement is enforceable); United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 863 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (same). For example, in United States v. Smith, the plea agreement included a clause relin-
quishing the defendant’s right to appeal her sentence. 500 F.3d at 1210. The court held that the waiver 
was knowing and voluntary because the waiver language in the plea agreement was clear, and because 
the court specifically had discussed her waiver of appellate rights during the plea colloquy. Id. at 
1210–11. 
 97 See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 215 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that 
waivers of the inadmissibility of plea discussions have become commonplace). 
 98 See, e.g., United States v. Jim, 786 F.3d 802, 806 (10th Cir. 2015) (allowing a waiver of FRE 
410 protections), aff’d, 804 F. App’x 895 (10th Cir. 2020). Withdrawing a plea is almost always con-
sidered to be a breach of a plea agreement. See id. (holding that a plea withdrawal was a breach of the 
agreement, even though the court had given permission for the withdrawal); Christopher B. Mueller, 
“Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse”—Mezzanatto Waivers as Lynchpin of Prosecutorial Over-
reach, 82 MO. L. REV. 1023, 1084–87 (2017) (citing cases in which plea withdrawals constituted a 
breach). 
 99 See United States v. Acosta-Ballardo, 8 F.3d 1532, 1536 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding FRCP 
11(e)(6)(D) waivers unenforceable); Mezzanatto I, 998 F.2d 1452, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993) (same), rev’d, 
513 U.S. 196; United States v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1982) (same). The Second, Ninth, 
and Tenth Circuits have concluded that waivers that allow for the admission of plea statements into 
evidence are unenforceable. Acosta-Ballardo, 8 F.3d at 1536; Mezzanatto I, 998 F.2d at 1456; Law-
son, 683 F.2d at 693. All three circuits emphasized that Congress’s clear intent in creating FRCP 
11(e)(6) and FRE 410 was to promote candid discussions that would lead to plea agreements. See 
Acosta-Ballardo, 8 F.3d at 1535–36 (explaining how the legislative history of the two rules clearly 
demonstrates an intent to promote plea bargaining); Mezzanatto I, 998 F.2d at 1455 (same); Lawson, 
683 F.2d at 692–93 (same). The three circuits opted not to uphold waivers that were clearly contrary 
to Congress’s intent. See Acosta-Ballardo, 8 F.3d at 1535–36 (refusing to uphold a waiver that was 
inconsistent with legislative intent); Mezzanatto I, 998 F.2d at 1456 (same); Lawson, 683 F.2d at 693 
(same). In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held that a FRE 410 waiver was enforceable. United States v. 
Dortch, 5 F.3d 1056, 1067–68 (7th Cir. 1993). The court reasoned that enforcement of the waiver 
would not frustrate the legislative intent behind FRE 410 or FRCP 11(e)(6) because signing a waiver 
after plea negotiations had already concluded would not discourage a defendant from entering plea 
talks. Id. at 1068. 
 100 513 U.S. at 197. FRCP 11(e)(6) no longer exists because of the 2002 amendment to the Rule, 
which made FRCP 11(f) simply cross reference FRE 410. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s 
notes to 2002 amendment. The modification of FRCP 11(f) did not cause the content of the Rule to 
change because FRE 410 and former FRCP 11(e)(6) are substantively the same. Compare FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 11(f), and FED. R. EVID. 410, with U.S. Dep’t Just., supra note 58. 
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to distribute.101 Prior to trial, the defendant and his attorney met with the pros-
ecutor to enter discussions about the possibility of aiding the government.102 
The prosecutor conditioned the meeting on Mezzanatto accepting that any 
statements made at the meeting could be used to impeach him if the case ever 
went to trial.103 At the meeting, Mezzanatto admitted to knowingly selling 
methamphetamine to an undercover officer, as well as to knowing about the 
manufacturer’s laboratory.104 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California tried Mez-
zanatto for his possession charge.105 On the stand, Mezzanatto denied his in-
volvement in the distribution of methamphetamine, stating that he had no 
knowledge of the manufacturer’s methamphetamine laboratory.106 The prose-
cutor cross-examined him about his inconsistency with statements made at the 
prior meeting.107 Mezzanatto denied making the earlier statements, causing the 
prosecution to call an agent who had been present at the meeting for corrobora-
tion.108 The prosecutor used statements that the defendant had made during 
plea negotiations for impeachment purposes, namely by presenting evidence 
that contradicted Mezzanatto’s testimony on the stand.109 The jury subsequent-
ly convicted Mezzanatto and sentenced him to 170 months in prison.110 
                                                                                                                           
 101 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 197–98. Under federal law, it is unlawful for a person to manufacture, 
distribute, or possess a controlled substance with the intention of manufacturing or distributing said 
substance. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Mezzanatto distributed methamphetamine on behalf of a manufac-
turer. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 199. The manufacturer was arrested and agreed to help police appre-
hend other members of his enterprise. Id. at 197–98. The police arrested Mezzanatto in a sting opera-
tion that the manufacturer helped orchestrate. Id. at 198. 
 102 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 198. 
 103 Id. Mezzanatto agreed to this condition after consulting his attorney. Id. 
 104 Id. at 198–99. Mezzanatto stated that up until his arrest he only had sold methamphetamine in 
ounce quantities. Id. at 198. Mezzanatto initially stated that he was just a dealer and had no knowledge 
that the manufacturer was producing methamphetamine at his home. Id. at 199. He later admitted to 
knowing about the methamphetamine laboratory. Id. In the meeting, Mezzanatto downplayed his 
involvement in the operation, at which point, the prosecutor ended the meeting because the govern-
ment had obtained contradictory information regarding Mezzanatto’s role. Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. Mezzanatto claimed that the manufacturer used the laboratory in his home to create explo-
sives for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Id. 
 107 Id. Defense counsel objected to this line of questioning, stating that the statements made dur-
ing plea negotiations were inadmissible under FRE 410. FED. R. EVID. 410; Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 
199. But because Mezzanatto had signed a waiver prior to his meeting with the prosecution, his state-
ments were deemed admissible. Eric L. Dahlin, Note, Will Plea Bargaining Survive United States v. 
Mezzanatto?, 74 OR. L. REV. 1365, 1369 (1995). 
 108 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 199. 
 109 See id. (noting that the district court permitted the admission of prior statements for impeach-
ment purposes). Impeachment is the presentation of evidence that contradicts a witness’s testimony. 
Impeachment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 8. For example, defendants can be impeached 
with a prior conviction or prior inconsistent statement if they deny them while testifying. FED. R. 
EVID. 410(b)(2); see, e.g., Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 199 (impeaching a defendant after his testimony 
contradicted statements he made during plea discussions). 
 110 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 199. 
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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to admit Mezzanat-
to’s prior statements.111 The court first looked to the language of FRE 410 itself, 
observing that FRE 410 is absolute, aside from two express exceptions, neither 
of which contemplate admission of statements for impeachment purposes.112 The 
Ninth Circuit then reviewed the legislative history of FRE 410, discerning that 
Congress clearly intended to exclude plea statements for impeachment purpos-
es.113 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Congress had not explicitly ad-
dressed whether criminal defendants could waive the protections of FRE 410 
and FRCP 11(e)(6).114 The court concluded, however, that enforcing waiver con-
travened congressional intent by essentially destroying the plea-bargaining 
mechanism.115 Effective plea bargaining, the court reasoned, is essential to the 
criminal justice system because it cuts costs and promotes efficiency and jus-
tice.116 If criminal defendants lack the protections that FRE 410 and FRCP 
11(e)(6) provide, they would be much less likely to participate cooperatively in 
                                                                                                                           
 111 Mezzanatto I, 998 F.2d 1452, 1460 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d, 513 U.S. 196. 
 112 Id. at 1454–55; see FED. R. EVID. 410 (listing the exceptions to FRE 410). First, courts may 
admit statements made during plea discussions to present a full picture of the negotiations to the jury 
if other statements from the plea discussions have been admitted. FED. R. EVID. 410; Mezzanatto I, 
998 F.2d at 1454. The legislature designed this exception to prevent counsel from selectively admit-
ting statements made during plea discussions. Mezzanatto I, 998 F.2d at 1454. Second, courts may 
admit plea statements in a separate perjury proceeding. FED. R. EVID. 410; Mezzanatto I, 998 F.2d at 
1454. The purpose of this exception is to prevent defendants from contradicting their plea statements 
in other proceedings. Mezzanatto I, 998 F.2d at 1454. 
 113 Mezzanatto I, 998 F.2d at 1454. The court cited advisory committee language that explicitly 
rejected an earlier draft of FRE 410 that would have allowed for plea statements to be used for im-
peachment purposes. Id.; see Act of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-149, 89 Stat. 805 (1975) (amend-
ing FRE 410, which previously allowed for the admission of plea statements for impeachment); FED. 
R. EVID. 410 (allowing statements to be used for impeachment); H.R. REP. NO. 94-414, at 10 (1975) 
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 713, 714 (same); S. REP. NO. 99-1277, at 10 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7057 (same). In similar cases, the Second and Fifth Circuits 
also noted Congress’s unmistakable intent to exclude plea statements from impeachment use. See 
United States v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688, 692–93 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that the legislative history of 
FRE 410 shows that Congress intended to exclude plea statements for impeachment); United States v. 
Martinez, 536 F.2d 1107, 1108 (5th Cir. 1976) (same). 
 114 Mezzanatto I, 998 F.2d at 1454. 
 115 Id. at 1456. The court also noted that FRE 410 and FRCP 11(e)(6) did not create substantive 
rights, but rather assured fair process. Id. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that defendants can waive 
certain rights during plea negotiations, such as the right to bring a civil action and the right to appeal. 
Id. at 1455–56; see Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 390 (1987) (waiving the right to sue a munici-
pality); United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 319–20 (9th Cir. 1990) (waiving the right to 
appeal). 
 116 Mezzanatto I, 998 F.2d at 1454. Many scholars contest the belief that plea bargaining pro-
motes justice and, instead, maintain that plea bargaining results in injustice for criminal defendants. 
Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer 
Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1140 (2011). They claim that defendants often enter unfavorable 
deals based on their attorney’s error and miss the opportunity of trial, which could have led to a more 
favorable result. Id. Additionally, because there is no formalized recording of the plea-bargaining 
process, unlike at criminal trial, the result lacks transparency. Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers 
of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 82 (2015). 
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plea discussions for fear that prosecutors would use their statements against 
them.117 Additionally, the court did not think that the government should be al-
lowed to obtain a waiver from a defendant who has less power because they are 
facing criminal charges.118 For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit reversed the low-
er court’s ruling and held that a criminal defendant could not waive the statutory 
ban on admission of statements made during plea negotiations.119 
The government appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.120 On appeal, Mezzanatto argued that the Court 
should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s holding and find his waiver inadmissible for 
three reasons: (1) plea-statement rules guarantee unwaivable procedural 
rights;121 (2) enforcement of the waiver would discourage plea agreements;122 
and (3) waiver would encourage abuse of prosecutorial power.123 
The Supreme Court noted that it had consistently held that criminal de-
fendants could waive some of their most fundamental rights, such as the right 
to a jury trial, the right to a double jeopardy defense, the right to confront one’s 
accuser, and the right to counsel.124 The Court also pointed to its previously 
acknowledged presumption of waivability with respect to the FRE.125 Addi-
                                                                                                                           
 117 Mezzanatto I, 998 F.2d at 1455. 
 118 Id. at 1456. 
 119 Id. Chief Justice Wallace dissented, stating that Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) should not be treated 
differently from the multitude of other rights that criminal defendants can waive. Id. at 1456–57 (Wal-
lace, J., dissenting). 
 120 United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 197 (1995). 
 121 Id. at 204. 
 122 Id. at 206. 
 123 Id. at 209. 
 124 Id. at 200–01. The court cited several cases as examples of the presumption of the waivability 
of the rights of criminal defendants. See id. (citing Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) 
(stating that criminal defendants can waive their fundamental rights)); Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 
1, 10 (1987) (holding that the double jeopardy defense is waivable in a plea agreement); Evans v. Jeff 
D., 475 U.S. 717, 730–31 (1986) (holding that the statutory right to attorney’s fees is waivable in the 
civil context); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (holding that a knowing and voluntary 
guilty plea waives the defendant’s right to a jury trial, the right against self-incrimination, and the 
right to face one’s accusers); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (approving a waiver of the 
right to counsel); Shutte v. Thompson, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 151, 151 (1872) (stating that a party may 
waive any right in a contract if it benefits him or her). 
 125 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 202; see Note, Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 HARV. L. 
REV. 138, 139–40 (1932) (stating that courts have widely enforced agreements waiving rules of evi-
dence); see also, e.g., Sac & Fox Indians v. Sac & Fox Indians, 220 U.S. 481, 488–89 (1911) (enforc-
ing waiver of hearsay objections). For example, in 1911, the Supreme Court enforced contracts that 
waived hearsay objections in Sac and Fox Indians of the Mississippi in Iowa v. Sac and Fox Indians of 
Mississippi in Oklahoma. 220 U.S. at 488–89. In that case, the Sac and Fox Indians of the Mississippi 
in Iowa sued the Sac and Fox Indians of the Mississippi in Oklahoma, as well as the United States, for 
failure to fulfill treaty obligations. Id. at 482. The Iowa and Oklahoma Indians agreed that the parties 
could admit ex parte affidavits as depositions, thereby waiving hearsay objections to that evidence. Id. 
at 488–89. The Supreme Court did not interpret Congress’s failure to address the issue of waivability 
as an implied rejection of the concept. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 203–04. Although the Court acknowl-
edged that some procedural rules are too fundamental to the fact-finding process to be waivable, it did 
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tionally, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s concern that 
waivers would discourage plea agreements.126 The Court noted that the Ninth 
Circuit had considered waiver from only the defendant’s perspective.127 Alt-
hough a defendant may be less likely to engage in a plea agreement with a 
waiver clause, a prosecutor may be unwilling to enter a plea agreement without 
one.128 The Court further indicated that the potential for prosecutorial abuse 
was not a compelling enough reason to prohibit waiver clauses in plea agree-
ments.129 The Court trusted that prosecutors would generally execute their du-
ties faithfully and fairly.130 
The Supreme Court concluded that FRE 410 and FRCP 11(e)(6) are pre-
sumptively waivable and, absent evidence that the defendant did not knowingly 
and voluntarily enter the plea agreement, courts should enforce these waiver 
                                                                                                                           
not conclude that the admission of plea statements fits into that category. Id. at 204. For example, the 
Court acknowledged that a defendant’s right to conflict-free counsel should not be waivable. See id. 
(citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162 (1988) (stating that a court may refuse to allow 
defendants to waive their right to conflict-free counsel)). Additionally, if a rule or statute expressly 
states that it is not waivable, then it cannot be waived contrary to the clear expression of Congress’s 
intent. Pamela Bennett Louis, Note, United States v. Mezzanatto: An Unheeded Plea to Keep the Ex-
clusionary Provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11(e)(6) Intact, 17 PACE L. REV. 231, 242 (1996). For example, FRCP 43 states that the defendant’s 
presence at court proceedings is not waivable. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43; Louis, supra, at 243. The Court 
also reasoned that the admission of plea statements would make verdicts more accurate, in that when 
prosecutors use statements from a prior plea negotiations for impeachment purposes, they reveal that 
defendants have lied to either the government or the jury. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204. Knowledge of 
the defendant’s untruthfulness, the Court reasoned, would aid the jury in reaching a proper verdict. Id. 
at 205. The Court also observed that FRE 410 only limits the admission of statements made in plea 
discussions against the defendant, meaning that the defendant may enter statements made in plea 
discussions for his or her benefit. Id.; see FED. R. EVID. 410 (limiting the use of statements made 
during plea discussions against the defendant). If a defendant makes the choice to enter such state-
ments, they open the door for the prosecution to enter statements from the same discussion if it would 
be unfair to exclude them. FED. R. EVID. 410(b)(1). This notion of a defendant “opening the door” to 
the presentation of certain evidence, is similar to the rationale behind FRE 404, which allows the 
prosecution to introduce rebuttal evidence of a defendant’s character trait only after the defendant 
presents evidence of that trait. Id. R. 404(a)(2)(A). 
 126 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 206–07 (citing Mezzanatto I, 998 F.2d 1452, 1455 (9th Cir. 1993), 
rev’d, 513 U.S. 196). 
 127 Id. at 207. 
 128 Id. Prosecutors are motivated to enter plea agreements because they can achieve a conviction 
without the time and expense of trial and because they are often able to gain insight into other relevant 
criminal activity. Mallord, supra note 21, at 688; Justin H. Dion, Note, Criminal Law—Prosecutorial 
Discretion or Contract Theory Restrictions?—The Implications of Allowing Judicial Review of Prose-
cutorial Discretion Founded on Underlying Contract Principles, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 149, 157 
(2000). 
 129 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210. 
 130 Id. Although the duty of most attorneys is to provide zealous advocacy for their clients, prose-
cutors have additional ethical responsibilities. Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Consti-
tutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 727 (1999). Prosecutors must not simply seek convictions, 
but seek to do justice. Id. Thus, two conflicting objectives influence prosecutors: (1) the duty to be the 
government’s zealous advocate, and (2) the responsibility to assure that justice is being served. Id. 
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clauses.131 Because Mezzanatto never suggested that he entered the plea agree-
ment involuntarily or unwittingly, and because he had the opportunity to con-
sult with his attorney, the Court overturned the Ninth Circuit to enforce the 
waiver.132 Thus, the Supreme Court held that statements made in the course of 
plea agreements subject to FRE 410 and FRCP 11(e)(6) waivers were admissi-
ble for impeachment purposes.133 
Justice Ginsburg penned a much-cited, single paragraph concurrence in 
which she expressed concern that a waiver that allowed for the use of plea 
statements for the prosecution’s case-in-chief could impede plea agreement 
negotiations.134 Justice Ginsburg believed that these waivers would take away 
a defendant’s opportunity to negotiate, and would thus discourage them from 
entering plea discussions at all.135 
Justice Souter dissented, arguing that enforcing FRE 410 waivers in plea 
agreements would be inconsistent with Congress’s intent to promote plea-
bargaining.136 He cited the advisory committee’s notes, which stated that FRE 
410’s explicit purpose was to foster candor in plea-bargaining.137 Justice Sout-
er further noted that Congress had designed the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
                                                                                                                           
 131 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210. 
 132 Id. at 210–11. Even if Mezzanatto had not had the opportunity to consult with his attorney, 
that would not necessarily have negated his plea. See United States v. Ortiz-Sanchez, 138 F. App’x 
921, 922 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that ineffective assistance of council does not necessarily render a 
plea unknowing or involuntary). 
 133 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210. 
 134 Id. at 211 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor and Justice Breyer joined the concur-
rence. Id. Because the waiver in the Mezzanatto case was specific to impeachment, the majority did 
not address the question of case-in-chief waivers. Id. Even though Justice Ginsberg’s concurrence was 
only one paragraph, circuit courts consistently have looked to it for guidance. See United States v. 
Newbert, 504 F.3d 180, 188 (1st Cir. 2007) (relying on Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Mezzanat-
to); United States v. Rebbe, 314 F.3d 402, 406 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Justice Ginsburg’s concur-
rence). Justice Ginsburg’s concerns have been realized as several circuits have allowed for the use of 
plea statements for the government’s case-in-chief. See, e.g., United States v. Jim, 786 F.3d 802, 813 
n.6 (10th Cir. 2015) (enforcing a waiver that allowed the government to use plea statements for the 
government’s case-in-chief), aff’d, 804 F. App’x 895 (10th Cir. 2020). Other courts have expanded 
the holding in Mezzanatto to allow the use of plea statements for rebuttal purposes. See, e.g., United 
States v. Roberts, 660 F.3d 149, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2011) (allowing the use of plea statements for rebut-
tal). 
 135 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 211 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  
 136 Id. at 213 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 
proposed rule). Justice Stevens joined the dissent. Id. at 211. Justice Souter cited Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Williamson v. United States, in which Justice Kennedy emphasized that the advisory 
committee’s notes are evidence of Congress’s intent. Id. at 213 (citing Williamson v. United States, 
512 U.S. 594, 614–15 (1994)).  
 137 FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rule; Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 
213 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to promote the criminal justice sys-
tem’s overall functionality and efficiency.138 
Additionally, Souter’s dissent identified several likely consequences of 
the majority’s decision.139 First, Justice Souter observed that as a result of the 
Court’s holding, prosecutors would default to including waivers in plea agree-
ments, thereby rendering FRE 410 and FRCP 11(e)(6) meaningless.140 Second, 
Justice Souter expressed his fear that such waivers eventually would function 
as a waiver of the right to trial itself because courts would extend the majori-
ty’s rationale behind approving waivers for limited impeachment purposes to 
admitting statements for the prosecutor’s case-in-chief.141 Justice Souter con-
cluded that such a practice, wherein prosecutors used plea negotiation state-
ments for their cases-in-chief, would be equivalent to defendants simply plead-
ing guilty, in that prosecutors would be able to present the defendant’s previ-
ous incriminating admissions to the jury.142 
II. THE EXTENSION OF MEZZANATTO 
Following the Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in United States v. Mezza-
natto, the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have been inconsistent in their en-
forcement of FRE 410 and FRCP 11(f) waivers against criminal defendants.143 
                                                                                                                           
 138 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 213 (Souter, J., dissenting). Although the majority believed that ad-
mitting plea statements would not discourage parties from entering plea agreements, Justice Souter 
reasoned that the Court’s view on this issue was irrelevant because it contradicted the view of Con-
gress. Id. at 215 (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)) (stating that 
congressional intent, not the Court’s opinion of how it can improve the law, should be the deciding 
factor). Justice Souter also stated that if the majority disagreed with Congress’s view that plea bar-
gaining would not be as effective with enforceable waivers, then the government could petition Con-
gress to change the rule. Id. at 216 n.1 (stating that it is the court’s role to interpret the federal rules 
considering Congress’ intent). 
 139 Id. at 216. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 217. 
 142 Id. at 218. 
 143 See Mueller, supra note 98, at 1084–87 (stating that the circuit courts’ applications of Mezza-
natto have been hugely varied). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all enforced waivers allowing prosecutors to use 
statements in their cases-in-chief. See United States v. Jim, 786 F.3d 802, 806 (10th Cir. 2015) (en-
forcing a plea waiver after the court had allowed the defendant to withdraw his plea), aff’d, 804 F. 
App’x 895 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 2009) (allowing 
the use of plea statements for the government’s case-in-chief); United States v. Fifer, 206 F. App’x 
502, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Young, 223 F.3d 905, 911 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(same); United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same). The Second, Third, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have enforced waivers allowing the use of plea statements for rebuttal 
purposes. See United States v. Roberts, 660 F.3d 149, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Hard-
wick, 544 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Rebbe, 314 F.3d 402, 408–09 (9th Cir. 
2002); United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020, 1026 (7th Cir. 1998). The First Circuit enforced a 
waiver that allowed for plea statements to be used exclusively for impeachment purposes, thus not 
extending the reading of Mezzanatto. See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210 (allowing plea statements to be 
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Some circuit courts have refused to enforce these waivers when they are not in 
the interest of justice.144 Other circuits have enforced the waivers when the 
prosecution uses the statements for limited rebuttal purposes.145 Still, other 
circuit courts have allowed prosecutors to use FRE 410 and FRCP 11(f) waiv-
ers to admit plea statements for use in their cases-in-chief.146 This Part discuss-
es the enforcement of plea waivers among the circuit courts.147 Section A of 
this Part compares two circuit courts’ approaches to plea waivers following the 
defendants’ withdrawal of their guilty pleas.148 Section B discusses the differ-
ence between the use of plea statements for impeachment purposes—using 
statements that directly impeach the defendant’s testimony—and rebuttal pur-
poses—using statements that contradict any evidence or testimony presented at 
trial.149 Section C examines United States v. Burch, in which the circuit court 
expanded the rationale in Mezzanatto to admit plea statements for use in the 
government’s case-in-chief, thus setting the stage for other circuits to enforce 
these waivers and threaten the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.150 
A. Differing Approaches to Waiver Clauses in Withdrawn Pleas 
When a court accepts a guilty plea, it has the discretion under FRCP 11 to 
allow a defendant to withdraw that plea if the defendant provides a “fair and 
just” reason for withdrawal.151 A withdrawal of a guilty plea, however, consti-
                                                                                                                           
used for impeachment purposes with a valid waiver); United States v. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d 7, 
16–17 (1st Cir. 2015) (same). In some cases, courts have not enforced waivers in extenuating circum-
stances. See United States v. Newbert, 504 F.3d 180, 181 (1st Cir. 2007) (declining to enforce a plea 
waiver when the defendant had withdrawn his plea after evidence of his innocence came to light). 
 144 See Newbert, 504 F.3d at 188–89 (Boudin, J., concurring) (stating that the court could have 
voided a 410 waiver if the court found that the defendant had breached the plea agreement because 
enforcing said waiver would have been contrary to the interests of justice); United States v. Teeter, 
257 F.3d 14, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2007) (refusing to enforce a waiver of the right to appeal because it 
would constitute a miscarriage of justice). 
 145 See Roberts, 660 F.3d at 163–64 (enforcing a rebuttal waiver); Hardwick, 544 F.3d at 570 
(same); Rebbe, 314 F.3d at 408–09 (same); Krilich, 159 F.3d at 1026 (same). 
 146 See Jim, 786 F.3d at 813 n.6 (enforcing a plea waiver after the court had allowed the defendant 
to withdraw his plea); Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 289 (allowing the use of plea statements for the govern-
ment’s case-in-chief); Fifer, 206 F. App’x at 509–10 (same); Young, 223 F.3d at 911 (same); Burch, 
156 F.3d at 1321 (same). 
 147 See infra notes 151–240 and accompanying text. 
 148 See infra notes 151–178 and accompanying text. 
 149 See infra notes 179–216 and accompanying text. 
 150 See infra notes 217–240 and accompanying text. 
 151 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B); see United States v. McTiernan, 546 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 
2008) (noting that a plea can be withdrawn if there is a “fair and just” reason for doing so), aff’d, 552 
F. App’x 749 (9th Cir. 2014). Previously recognized “fair and just” reasons include insufficient plea 
instructions, new evidence, or changed circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Ortega-Ascanio, 376 
F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 2004) (allowing a defendant to withdraw his plea when a Supreme Court case 
intervened). But see United States v. Turner, 898 F.2d 705, 713 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a change 
of mind does not constitute a “fair and just” reason for withdrawing a guilty plea). 
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tutes a breach of a plea agreement contract.152 What consequences should a 
defendant face if a judge allows the withdrawal of a guilty plea that includes a 
waiver of FRE 410 and FRCP 11(f) protections post-Mezzzanatto?153 
In 2007, the First Circuit held, in United States v. Newbert, that a FRE 
410 waiver in a plea agreement was not enforceable when the defendant with-
drew his guilty plea after evidence of his innocence became available.154 In 
Newbert, the defendant signed a form containing a provision that allowed the 
government to use statements made during plea negotiations if he decided 
against pleading guilty or withdrew his guilty plea.155 Soon afterward, the de-
fendant sought to withdraw his plea because evidence of his innocence had 
surfaced.156 The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine found that alt-
hough the defendant’s guilty plea had been knowing and voluntary, the appear-
ance of evidence supporting his innocence constituted a “fair and just” reason 
for allowing him to withdraw his plea.157 The district court found that when the 
defendant withdrew his plea, he did not breach his plea agreement, and thus 
had not waived FRE 410.158 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See Mueller, supra note 98, at 1039 (stating that withdrawing a plea constitutes a breach of the 
plea agreement). 
 153 Compare United States v. Newbert, 504 F.3d 180, 181 (1st Cir. 2007) (declining to enforce a 
plea waiver), with United States v. Jim, 786 F.3d 802, 806 (10th Cir. 2015) (enforcing a plea waiver 
after a plea withdrawal), aff’d, 804 F. App’x 895 (10th Cir. 2020). 
 154 504 F.3d at 181, 183. Scholars have acknowledged that the court’s actions in Newbert are not 
the norm. See Mueller, supra note 98, at 1042–43 (stating that most courts do enforce plea waivers). 
Most courts not only enforce plea waivers, but also extend them. Id. 
 155 504 F.3d at 183. Newbert pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute. Id. The police had found 18.3 grams of cocaine at Newbert’s residence. Id. Per his plea 
agreement, Newbert agreed to the following provision: “If defendant fails to enter a guilty plea or 
seeks and is allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty . . . he hereby waives any rights that he has under 
Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.” Id. The clause explicitly stated that the defendant understood that, due to his guilty plea, any 
statements made surrounding his plea and during the plea negotiations would be usable against him. 
Id. 
 156 Id. Newbert originally pleaded guilty to shield his wife and his friend, James Michael Smith, 
but later discovered that the two were living together and that Smith would be testifying against him. 
Id. One of Newbert’s daughters told him that Smith had confessed to owning the cocaine. Id. Smith 
was the prosecution’s only non-expert witness and there was no physical proof that connected New-
bert to the cocaine aside from the fact that the police had discovered it in his home. Id. 
 157 United States v. Newbert (Newbert I), 471 F. Supp. 2d 182, 199 (D. Me. 2007), aff’d, 504 F.3d 
180; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B) (stating that a defendant can withdraw a plea before sentencing 
if the defendant can show a “fair and just” reason for doing so). The court ultimately decided that 
allowing the defendant to have a jury trial was the best course of action because the defendant’s free-
dom was at stake. Newbert I, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 199. The government filed a motion to reconsider the 
district court’s order allowing for the plea withdrawal. Newbert, 504 F.3d at 184. The government 
then filed a motion in limine requesting that the defendant’s guilty plea and his statements made dur-
ing the plea discussions be admissible against him at trial. Id. The defendant subsequently filed an 
opposing motion. Id. 
 158 Newbert, 504 F.3d at 184. 
2021] Mezzanatto: “A Waiver of the Trial Itself” 995 
On appeal, the First Circuit applied traditional contract principles to the 
plea agreement at issue, noting that uncertain terms should be construed against 
the government as the drafting party.159 The court evaluated the plea agreement 
within the “four corners” of the document.160 The court observed that the gov-
ernment’s inclusion of the phrase “under circumstances constituting a breach of 
this Agreement” in the plea agreement suggested that there are some situations in 
which a plea withdrawal would be acceptable without constituting a breach of 
the plea agreement.161 
Additionally, the court recognized that criminal defendants facing impris-
onment are in a weaker bargaining position.162 Based on these high stakes, the 
court deduced that contract principles should apply differently to plea agree-
ments than to commercial contracts.163 The court ultimately upheld the district 
court’s decision, endorsing its reasoning that, in this case, the plea withdrawal 
did not constitute a plea agreement breach.164 The First Circuit invoked Justice 
Ginsburg’s concurrence in Mezzanatto, which acknowledged that allowing the 
government to use waivers to admit plea statements for its case-in-chief would 
likely harm the plea-bargaining process.165 
Chief Judge Boudin concurred, stressing that even if the district court de-
termined that the defendant had breached the plea agreement, it could have 
chosen not to enforce the waiver clause.166 Boudin cited the First Circuit’s 
2007 decision in United States v. Teeter, in which the court chose not to en-
                                                                                                                           
 159 Id. at 185 (citing United States v. Giorgi, 840 F.2d 1022, 1026 (1st Cir. 1988)). 
 160 United States v. Newbert (Newbert II), 477 F. Supp. 2d 287, 290 (D. Me. 2007), aff’d, 504 
F.3d 180; see Newbert, 504 F.3d at 186 (adhering to the district court’s reading of the plea agree-
ment). Under the four corners rule, judges consider the meaning of a contract without extrinsic evi-
dence, limiting their analysis to the words that appear in the contract itself. Steven J. Burton, A Lesson 
on Some Limits of Economic Analysis: Schwartz and Scott on Contract Interpretation, 88 IND. L.J. 
339, 342 (2013). 
 161 Newbert II, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 290–91 (emphasis omitted). The government subsequently 
appealed the decision. Newbert, 504 F.3d at 184. 
 162 See Newbert, 504 F.3d at 187 (describing the different obligations and interests of the parties). 
 163 United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986). In the Fourth Circuit’s 1986 deci-
sion in United States v. Harvey, the court stated that the Constitution provides the basis for a criminal 
defendant’s contractual rights, and therefore the considerations are different and broader than those 
applied to commercial contracts. Id. In Harvey, the defendant was charged with several drug-related 
offenses including drug smuggling. Id. at 295. The defendant moved to enforce a plea agreement that 
he claimed had barred his prosecution in other districts. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the term 
in question was ambiguous and, as a result, construed the term in favor of the defendant, barring pros-
ecutions in other districts. Id. 
 164 Newbert, 504 F.3d at 188. 
 165 Id. (quoting United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 211 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)) 
(expressing concern about the use of plea statements for the government’s case-in-chief). 
 166 Newbert, 504 F.3d at 188–89 (Boudin, J., concurring) (“For good cause, the district court can 
relieve a defendant of such a waiver—just as it can relieve parties from a stipulation or refuse to honor 
a plea agreement’s waiver of the right to appeal when the waiver would effect a ‘miscarriage of jus-
tice.’”). 
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force a waiver of the right to appeal because the waiver involved trial rights 
and could result in a “miscarriage of justice.”167 The Teeter court acknowl-
edged that the “miscarriage of justice standard” was not particularly clear, but 
identified several relevant factors, such as the obviousness, magnitude, and 
character of the error, the effect of the error on the defendant, the burden on the 
government to correct the error, and the defendant’s level of cooperation.168 
The First Circuit’s refusal to enforce a waiver clause in Newbert stands in 
contrast to the approach taken by the Tenth Circuit in its 2015 decision in 
United States v. Jim.169 In Jim, the Tenth Circuit enforced a FRE 410 waiver 
after the defendant withdrew his plea.170 In assessing the plea waiver validity, 
the Tenth Circuit considered only whether the defendant’s plea was knowing 
                                                                                                                           
 167 Id. at 189 n.8 (citing United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2007)). In Teeter, 
the defendant was charged with several federal and state charges. 257 F.3d at 20. The defendant en-
tered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to several charges, including conspiracy, intent to use a firearm 
to commit a violent crime, and aiding and abetting interstate domestic violence. Id. The defendant also 
waived her right to appeal. Id. In return, the government agreed to drop a kidnapping charge, as well 
as other charges. Id. During a change of plea hearing, the court asked the defendant if she had entered 
her plea knowingly and voluntarily. Id. The court failed to mention her waiver of the right to appeal 
and misstated that she possessed that right. Id. The defendant then challenged the appeal waiver. Id. 
The First Circuit acknowledged that plea waivers were valid, but held that courts could refuse to en-
force them if there was a risk of a “miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 25–26. The First Circuit ultimately 
did not enforce the waiver. Id. at 31. 
 168 Id. at 26. 
 169 Compare United States v. Jim, 786 F.3d 802, 806 (10th Cir. 2015) (enforcing a waiver in a 
withdrawn plea agreement), aff’d, 804 F. App’x 895 (10th Cir. 2020), with Newbert, 504 F.3d at 188 
(affirming the district court’s decision not to enforce a plea waiver). 
 170 786 F.3d at 806. Derrick Jim pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual abuse inside the Navajo 
Nation. Id. at 804. The jury found that Jim had dragged the victim from a couch, causing her to hit her 
head, and then proceeded to vaginally and anally rape her. Id. at 805. His plea agreement contained a 
waiver of FRE 410. Id. The agreement also included a waiver of FRE 801(d)(2)(A), which states that 
an opposing party’s statements are not hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A); Jim, 786 F.3d at 806. Jim 
subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his plea, claiming that there was new evidence to impeach 
the victim, and that he had not entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily. Jim, 786 F.3d at 807. Prior 
to this motion, Jim had stated pro se that he did not know that by signing the plea agreement he would 
be waiving his right to a trial. Id. The district court expressed concern regarding Jim’s alleged una-
wareness that by pleading guilty he would be forsaking a trial. Id. at 807–08. FRCP 11(b)(1)(C) and 
(F) require that the judge accepting a guilty plea inform defendants that they are waiving their right to 
a trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(C), (F). The magistrate judge who accepted Jim’s plea had neglected 
to tell Jim that he was waiving his right to a trial, further compounding the court’s unease. Jim, 786 
F.3d at 808. As a result, although the court allowed Jim to withdraw his guilty plea, the court specifi-
cally warned him that because of the FRE 410 waiver, the prosecution could present his statements 
made during plea negotiations to the jury. Id. When Jim withdrew his plea, the government added an 
additional charge of aggravated sexual abuse—anal penetration by force. Id. at 805. Jim filed a motion 
in limine to stop the government from using his plea statements against him at trial, claiming that this 
would lead to an unfair trial. Id. at 808. His motion also argued that he did not knowingly enter his 
guilty plea, containing the FRE 410 waiver, because he did not have access to the government’s evi-
dence against him, which would have been available to him through discovery. Id. The court denied 
the motion. Id. As a result, the government was able to use the defendant’s plea statements against 
him, and the jury convicted him. Id. at 805. Jim was sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment. Id. 
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and voluntary.171 This approach contrasts sharply with that of the First Circuit, 
which accepted that the defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary, but still 
held a similar agreement unenforceable.172 The Tenth Circuit determined that 
the defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary based on his age and educa-
tion, his prior experience pleading guilty, and the clear language of the plea 
agreement.173 The Tenth Circuit also interpreted Mezzanatto as stating that the 
only ground for ignoring a waiver was if it was not “knowing and volun-
tary.”174 Scholars characterize this reading as problematic for defendants who 
withdraw a plea for a “fair and just” reason.175 Despite the trial court’s finding 
that the defendant had a valid reason to withdraw his plea, the Tenth Circuit 
chose to enforce the waiver, without any consideration of fairness, because 
there was no constitutional violation.176 The court addressed neither the argu-
ment that FRCP 11 permits withdrawal of guilty pleas for “fair and just” rea-
sons, nor the argument that FRE 410 waiver robbed the defendant of his right 
to a fair trial.177 Unlike the First Circuit’s ultimate decision not to enforce the 
FRE 410 waiver, citing policy concerns, the Tenth Circuit’s approach strictly 
enforced the terms of Jim’s guilty plea without a fairness analysis.178 
                                                                                                                           
 171 See Jim, 786 F.3d at 810, 813 (addressing only the issue of the defendant’s knowing and vol-
untary acceptance of the plea waiver and sentencing). The defendant argued that the Court in Mezza-
natto, in stating that a defendant must show “some affirmative indication that the [waiver] was entered 
into unknowingly or voluntarily,” had set forth a new evidentiary standard for defendants challenging 
whether they entered a plea knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 810 (citing United States v. Mezzanatto, 
513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995)). The court rejected this argument and held that the defendant had the bur-
den of proving whether the plea was knowing or voluntary under the regular evidentiary standards. Id. 
at 811. 
 172 See Newbert I, 471 F. Supp. 2d 182, 199 (D. Me. 2007), aff’d, 504 F.3d 180 (finding that a 
defendant entered a plea knowingly and voluntarily, but still refusing to enforce the agreement). Com-
pare id. at 806 (holding that a FRE 410 waiver was enforceable), with Newbert, 504 F.3d at 188 (up-
holding the district court’s decision not to enforce a plea agreement that was entered knowingly and 
voluntarily). 
 173 Jim, 786 F.3d at 813. At the time the agreement was signed, Jim was twenty-eight years old, 
had a high school diploma, and had some college credits. Id. He previously had pleaded guilty to two 
drunk driving charges. Id. 
 174 See id. at 810, 813 (addressing the knowing and voluntary factors exclusively when evaluating 
the validity of a waiver clause); Mueller, supra note 98, at 1076 (criticizing the Tenth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Jim for ignoring fairness considerations). 
 175 Mueller, supra note 98, at 1076. 
 176 Id. at 1076–77. 
 177 See Jim, 786 F.3d at 810, 813 (addressing only whether the defendant’s plea was knowing and 
voluntary). 
 178 See Mueller, supra note 98, at 1076 (expressing concerns about the fairness of the Jim deci-
sion). Compare Jim, 786 F.3d at 806 (applying strict enforcement of a plea waiver after it had been 
withdrawn), with United States v. Newbert, 504 F.3d 180, 187–88 (1st Cir. 2007) (declining to en-
force a plea waiver after taking into consideration policy implications). 
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B. The Use of Plea Statements for Impeachment and Rebuttal Purposes 
The Supreme Court in Mezzanatto endorsed FRE 410 and FRCP 11(f) 
waivers to admit plea statements exclusively for impeachment purposes.179 
Under a strict reading of Mezzanatto, the only time these waivers would be 
triggered is when a defendant testifies and contradicts statements made earlier 
during plea discussions.180 Thus, the risk of plea statements coming out at trial 
is very much within the defendant’s control—he or she can choose not to testi-
fy while still presenting a competent defense.181 On the other hand, an expan-
sive reading of Mezzanatto enforces waivers to admit statements for rebuttal 
purposes and for the government’s case-in-chief, thereby severely limiting a 
criminal defendant’s ability to present a competent defense.182 
Following Mezzanatto, some appellate courts have enforced waivers to al-
low for the use of plea statements for rebuttal purpose, whereas others have 
declined to uphold such waivers.183 For example, in 2002, in United States v. 
Rebbe, the Ninth Circuit extended the rationale of Mezzanatto to the use of 
plea statements subject to FRE 410 and FRCP 11(f) waivers for rebuttal pur-
poses, but not for the government’s case-in-chief.184 In contrast, in 2015, in 
United States v. Jiménez-Bencevi, the First Circuit opted not to allow the use of 
plea statements for rebuttal purposes when the agreement did not specify that 
the statements could be used for a non-impeachment purpose.185 
In Rebbe, the defendant argued that the government could use his plea 
statements only for impeachment purposes, and that the district court had erred 
                                                                                                                           
 179 513 U.S. 196, 210 (1995). 
 180 See generally id. (failing to address the possibility of lower courts expanding upon the Court’s 
ruling). 
 181 See Mueller, supra note 98, at 1078, 1081 (observing that even impeachment waivers can have 
negative effects, in that defendants are unlikely to testify); Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Si-
lencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1450, 1459 (2005) (stating that, as of 2002, 
just over fifty percent of defendants who proceed to trial end up testifying on their own behalf). 
 182 See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 217 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority’s ra-
tionale likely will be expanded to include case-in-chief waivers); Mueller, supra note 98, at 1081 
(stating that rebuttal evidence is much more harmful to a defendant, in comparison to impeachment 
evidence, because it almost entirely prevents the defendant from presenting a competent defense). 
 183 See United States v. Roberts, 660 F.3d 149, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2011) (allowing the prosecution 
to use the defendant’s statements made during plea negotiations for rebuttal purposes); United States 
v. Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565, 569–70 (3d Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020, 
1026 (7th Cir. 1998) (same). 
 184 314 F.3d 402, 408–09 (9th Cir. 2002). Scholars note that the Mezzanatto decision, unlike Reb-
be, did not address whether a prosecutor could use a defendant’s plea statements for rebuttal purposes 
with a valid FRE 410 waiver. Colin Miller, Deal or No Deal: Why Courts Should Allow Defendants to 
Present Evidence That They Rejected Favorable Plea Bargains, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 407, 411 (2011). 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit relied upon the analysis in Mezzanatto to reach its decision. Rebbe, 
314 F.3d at 407. 
 185 See 788 F.3d 7, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2015) (refusing to extend a FRE 410 waiver beyond the scope 
of the plea agreement). 
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in admitting his statements for the government’s case-in-chief.186 The Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that the government had not used the plea statements for its 
case-in-chief because the statements were only used to contradict evidence and 
testimony presented at trial that conflicted with the defendant’s prior state-
ments.187 Had the waiver permitted the use of plea statements for the govern-
ment’s case-in-chief, the court stated it would have the same concerns as Jus-
tice Ginsburg in Mezzanatto.188 Because those facts had not come before the 
                                                                                                                           
 186 314 F.3d at 406. The Mezzanatto ruling explicitly endorses waivers of FRE 410 and FRCP 
11(e)(6) only to admit statements for impeachment purposes. 513 U.S. at 210. In Rebbe, the govern-
ment charged defendant Roger Rebbe, an accountant, with conspiracy to evade workers’ compensa-
tion payments and federal payroll taxes. 314 F.3d at 404. Rebbe assisted Sherman Oaks Tree Service 
and its CEO, George Buskett, in the tax evasion scheme. Id. Rebbe had told Buskett to open two sepa-
rate bank accounts—the “green account” and the “blue account.” Id. Money accumulated from the 
business would be placed into the “blue account,” and then a share of the income would be consistent-
ly transferred from the “blue account” to the “green account.” Id. The company only reported income 
from the “green account” to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Id. Rebbe was responsible for filing 
the company’s tax returns. Id. The IRS audited Buskett and requested all the deposit slips from the 
“green account” to see where the money had originated. Id. Rebbe and Buskett created fake deposit 
slips to make it appear that the money in the “green account” had come from several different sources, 
even though all of the money had actually come from the “blue account.” Id. Before entering plea 
negotiations, Rebbe signed a waiver that stated that the government could use any statements from the 
meeting for cross-examination or to rebut any other evidence or argument presented in the case. Id. 
The waiver specifically stated that the government could not use statements for its case-in-chief. Id. 
The waiver read: “[T]he government may use . . . statements made . . . at the meeting and all evidence 
. . . from those statements for the purposes of cross-examination . . . or to rebut any evidence, argu-
ment or representations offered by or on behalf of [the defendant] . . . .” Id. In his proffer, Rebbe dis-
closed that he had advised his co-conspirator to open a hidden account and that he knew that the tax 
returns he filed were not accurate. Id. He met with the government a second time, again signing a 
waiver, and admitted that he had created false deposit slips and filed fraudulent tax returns. Id. Plea 
discussions did not result in an agreement, and a grand jury later indicted Rebbe. Id. The government 
planned to use Rebbe’s statements during plea discussions at trial for rebuttal purposes. Id. Rebbe 
filed a motion to prohibit the admission of his statements. Id. His motion failed to persuade the district 
court. Id. at 404–05. Rebbe presented his defense and the government moved to introduce his state-
ments made during plea negotiations, arguing that the testimony and evidence presented was contra-
dictory to Rebbe’s statements. Id. at 405. Although Rebbe did not testify himself, he did call four 
witnesses to testify on his behalf. Id. The government used Rebbe’s statements to rebut his claims that 
he did not know that the payroll tax returns were inaccurate, that he had not advised Mr. Buskett on 
where he should deposit checks, and that he did not participate in the making of fake deposit slips. Id. 
The court allowed the use of the statements and Rebbe was convicted on all counts. Id. Rebbe was 
sentenced to one year and one day in prison followed by three years of supervised release, and re-
quired to pay a $1,800 special assessment fee. Id. 
 187 Rebbe, 314 F.3d at 406. Rebbe had presented evidence that Buskett was financially sophisti-
cated enough to have operated the scheme on his own. Id. at 407. He also had witnesses testify that 
Rebbe had only ever received records from the “green account,” suggesting that Rebbe had no 
knowledge of the existence of the “blue account.” Id. Finally, Rebbe presented evidence that he had 
not participated in creating the fraudulent deposit slips. Id. 
 188 See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 211 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that plea waivers allowing 
the government to use plea statements for their cases-in-chief likely would inhibit plea agreements); 
Rebbe, 314 F.3d at 406 n.1 (noting that the concerns in Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence would be rele-
vant if the waiver allowed for statements to be admitted for the prosecution’s case-in-chief). 
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court, however, it did not conclusively address the potential of a chilling effect 
on the plea-bargaining process.189 
The Ninth Circuit observed that the agreement expressly stated that the 
defendant’s statements could be used for rebuttal purposes and both the de-
fendant and his attorney had signed the waiver.190 Because the Supreme Court 
in Mezzanatto had held that waivers of FRE 410 and FRCP 11(f) were pre-
sumptively enforceable, the court stated that the defendant bore the burden of 
overcoming this presumption.191 The Ninth Circuit determined that the defend-
ant had failed to distinguish the use of rebuttal evidence from impeachment 
evidence.192 The court further reasoned that the facts of the case were suffi-
ciently similar to those of Mezzanatto, and ultimately held that waivers of FRE 
410 and FRCP 11(f) were enforceable in an agreement that explicitly stated 
that plea statements could be used for rebuttal purposes.193 
In Jiménez-Bencevi, defendant Xavier Jiménez-Bencevi was charged with 
witness tampering, possession and use of a firearm in furtherance of a violent 
crime, and the use of a cell phone to attempt kidnapping.194 The charges arose 
from the defendant’s alleged attempt to kidnap a woman, Delia Sánchez-
Sánchez.195 When she resisted, the defendant allegedly shot and killed her.196 As 
                                                                                                                           
 189 Rebbe, 314 F.3d at 406. 
 190 Id. at 407. The court determined that it was clear that the defendant’s presentation of evidence, 
which contradicted statements he had made at the plea meeting, triggered the waiver. Id. 
 191 Id. (citing Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204). 
 192 See id. (holding that the circumstances in this case were analogous to those of Mezzanatto). 
 193 Id. at 407–09. The Ninth Circuit stated that the admission of plea statements promotes the 
truth-seeking function of trials and encourages defendants to present honest defenses. Id. The defend-
ant argued that the enforcement of waivers allowing rebuttal evidence would discourage defendants 
from participating in the plea agreement process, and that the enforcement of those waivers ran coun-
ter to Congress’s intention of promoting plea bargains. Id. at 408. The Ninth Circuit noted that the 
defendant in Mezzanatto raised these concerns, and that the Supreme Court ultimately determined that 
such concerns were insufficient to overcome the presumption of waivability. Id. Because Rebbe could 
not present any evidence to demonstrate that defendants would be significantly deterred from entering 
plea bargains, his argument was unsuccessful. Id. The defendant also claimed that enforcement of the 
clause would deprive him of his right to present a defense at trial. Id. This argument did not convince 
the court because the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the terms with counsel pre-
sent, and because the agreement only limited his defense in that he could not contradict any of the 
statements made during plea discussions. Id. The court noted that Rebbe could have successfully de-
fended against the admission of the statements by challenging the government’s evidence, questioning 
the credibility of the government’s witnesses, raising doubts about inconsistencies in the govern-
ment’s evidence, or challenging the government’s witnesses with respect to their qualifications and 
motivations for testifying. Id. 
 194 788 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 2015). The prosecution alleged that Jiménez-Bencevi murdered 
Sánchez-Sánchez to keep her from providing evidence to the authorities that connected him to another 
crime. Id. A month before his trial, Jiménez-Bencevi had approached the government in the hopes of 
entering a plea agreement to avoid the death penalty. Id. at 10. The defendant stated that he would 
enter a guilty plea if the government would not seek the death penalty. Id. 
 195 Id. at 9–10. 
 196 Id. 
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a prerequisite to entering plea discussions, the government had the defendant 
sign a proffer agreement that outlined his role in the commission of the crimes 
and provided information about the other parties involved.197 The agreement 
included a waiver that stated that if the defendant were to subsequently testify 
inconsistently with this proffer statement, the government would impeach his 
statements.198 After receiving the defendant’s proffer statement, the govern-
ment rejected his guilty plea and the case went to trial.199 
As part of their evidence, the prosecution presented a surveillance video 
that captured the murder at the center of the case.200 In support of his defense, 
Jiménez-Bencevi planned to call the former Chief of the Special Photographic 
Unit of the FBI Laboratory as an expert witness.201 The government objected 
to this expert’s testimony because it directly contradicted the proffer in which 
the defendant had claimed that he shot Sánchez-Sánchez.202 The jury ultimate-
ly convicted the defendant and sentenced him to life in prison without the pos-
sibility of parole.203 
The First Circuit’s opinion emphasized the clear differences between re-
buttal and impeachment purposes.204 The First Circuit stated that nothing in the 
waiver expressly allowed the government to use the defendant’s proffer state-
                                                                                                                           
 197 Id. In the proffer agreement, the defendant agreed to a life sentence without the possibility of 
parole. Id. The government also stated that no statements made in the proffer would be used against 
Jiménez-Bencevi in the District of Puerto Rico. Id. A proffer agreement is an agreement between a 
prosecutor and a defendant that provides immunity for the defendant, but allows the prosecutor to 
follow any leads that come from the defendant’s disclosures. Proffer Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY, supra note 8. These agreements are often prerequisites to entering a plea agreement. Robert 
I. Smith, III, Fair Play and Criminal Justice: Drafting Proffer Agreements in Light of Total Waiver of 
Rule 410, 66 S. C. L. REV. 809, 810 (2015). These proffer agreements often include FRE 410 waivers. 
Id. The rules governing proffer agreements are less defined than those governing plea agreements, and 
thus the protections afforded to defendants entering proffer agreements are more limited. Id. at 815. 
The First Circuit stressed that the district court’s enforcement of the agreement was particularly unac-
ceptable given that it was an unaccepted proffer agreement. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 17–18; see 
Smith, supra, at 815 (explaining that proffer agreements provide little protection for criminal defend-
ants).  
 198 Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 16. 
 199 Id. at 10. 
 200 Id. at 11. 
 201 Id. at 13. The expert witness would have testified that the person in the video was not Jimé-
nez-Bencevi because, in his expert opinion, the shooter was at least five feet and ten and a half inches 
tall, whereas Jiménez-Bencevi was only five feet and seven inches. Id. Another suspect, Jiménez-
Bencevi’s brother Raymond, was five feet and ten inches tall. Id. 
 202 Id. at 13. The district court overruled the government’s objection, but told the defendant that 
he had an obligation to inform the expert witness about the contents of the proffer. Id. Jiménez-
Bencevi objected, arguing that this would open the door for his expert to be cross-examined about the 
proffer, essentially admitting the proffer itself into evidence. Id. at 14. The court stated that Jiménez-
Bencevi could not hire an expert to testify to something that he knew to be entirely false, and thus 
barred Jiménez-Bencevi from calling an expert witness. Id. 
 203 Id. at 14. 
 204 Id. at 16. 
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ments for any purpose other than impeachment.205 Thus, allowing the govern-
ment to cross-examine the defendant’s expert witness about the proffer state-
ment exceeded the scope of the agreement.206 The court noted that waivers that 
allow plea statements to be used for rebuttal can limit a defense case in certain 
circumstances.207 For example, if the defense presented a video that unequivo-
cally showed a different perpetrator committing the crime, the court would 
need to exclude this conclusive evidence because it was inconsistent with the 
proffer.208 Scholars argue that not admitting evidence that conflicts with a plea 
statement is significantly more limiting to the defense than the possibility of 
the prosecution impeaching a defendant who chooses to testify.209 
In Jiménez-Bencevi, the First Circuit also acknowledged that there were 
many reasons that a defendant might be dishonest in plea statements when try-
ing to avoid the death penalty.210 For example, the defendant may find making 
a deal to accept life in prison preferable to the possibility of death.211 The de-
fendant also could be covering for another person.212 Furthermore, the defend-
ant may suffer from an impairment or delusions.213 This acknowledgement that 
defendants may agree to untrue plea statements is in tension with the Supreme 
Court’s contention in Mezzanatto that the admission of plea statements would 
augment the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice system.214 Because 
Mezzanatto exclusively contemplates the use of plea statements for impeach-
ment purposes, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court would expect rebuttal 
and case-in-chief waivers also to result in more accurate verdicts.215 Although 
the First Circuit acknowledged that waiver clauses that allow for plea state-
                                                                                                                           
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 See id. (distinguishing the proffer agreement at issue from those that expressly contemplate the 
use of plea statements for rebuttal purposes); Mueller, supra note 98, at 1081 (arguing that rebuttal 
waivers hinder a competent defense). 
 208 Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 18. 
 209 See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 98, at 1081 (stating that waivers permitting plea statements for 
rebuttal purposes are more harmful than those for impeachment because the former limit a defendant’s 
ability to bring forth a meaningful defense). This principle is echoed in the 1990 Supreme Court case, 
James v. Illinois, in which the court refused to expand the impeachment exception to other witnesses 
because doing so would have prevented defendants from mounting a competent defense. 493 U.S. 
307, 318 (1990). 
 210 788 F.3d at 17–18. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Compare United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204 (1995) (stating that plea waivers 
would result in more accurate verdicts), with Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 17–18 (stating that people 
often have motives to plead guilty when they are not actually guilty). Mezzanatto exclusively dis-
cussed the use of plea statements for impeachment purposes, but not for rebuttal or case-in-chief. 513 
U.S. at 204. 
 215 See 513 U.S. at 204 (discussing the use of plea statements for impeachment purposes exclu-
sively). 
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ments to be used for rebuttal purposes are perfectly valid when clearly outlined 
in the agreement, the court’s discussion revealed that the use of evidence for 
rebuttal, rather than impeachment purposes, could mean the difference be-
tween a guilty and not-guilty verdict.216 
C. The Use of Plea Statements for the Government’s Case-in-Chief 
The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, and the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals, all have expanded the rationale in Mezzanatto to enforce 
waivers allowing prosecutors to use plea statements in their cases-in-chief.217 
These circuits have found that if a defendant enters a plea knowingly and vol-
untarily, there is no reason to treat case-in-chief waivers differently from the 
impeachment waiver in Mezzanatto.218 For example, in 1998, in United States 
v. Burch, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld a waiver clause in a 
plea agreement that allowed the government to use plea statements in its case-
in-chief.219 After his arrest, defendant Larry Burch entered negotiations and 
pled guilty to possession with the intent to distribute crack cocaine.220 The 
government agreed to request dismissal of the other three counts on his in-
dictment, to permit pre-sentence release, and to inform the U.S. Departure 
Guideline Committee (Guideline Committee) of how Burch had cooperated 
with the government.221 
Burch subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his plea, claiming that he 
was innocent of the alleged offense.222 The trial court granted Burch’s motion, 
                                                                                                                           
 216 Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d at 16. 
 217 See United States v. Jim, 786 F.3d 802, 813 n.6 (10th Cir. 2015) (enforcing waivers that allow 
for the use of plea statements in the government’s case-in-chief), aff’d, 804 F. App’x 895 (10th Cir. 
2020); United States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Fifer, 
206 F. App’x 502, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Young, 223 F.3d 905, 909–11 (8th 
Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same). 
 218 See Jim, 786 F.3d at 813 n.6 (expanding the rationale in Mezzanatto to case-in-chief waivers); 
Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 289 (same); Fifer, 206 F. App’x at 509–10 (same); Young, 223 F.3d at 911 
(same); Burch, 156 F.3d at 1321 (same). 
 219 156 F.3d at 1321. 
 220 Id. at 1318. He was found with more than fifty grams of cocaine. Id. He also was acquitted of 
a conspiracy charge. Id. at 1317. 
 221 Id. at 1318. The Guideline Committee can file a pleading with the sentencing court if a de-
fendant has been sufficiently cooperative with a criminal investigation. U.S. Dep’t Just., supra note 
58, § 9-27.410. The court may depart from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Id. In this case, if the 
committee had found Burch’s help sufficient, it would have filed a motion allowing the sentencing 
judge to depart from the guidelines. Burch, 156 F.3d at 1318–19. 
 222 Burch, 156 F.3d at 1318–19. With his motion, Burch included a letter to the trial judge, stating 
that he had no knowledge of the drugs and that they belonged to Bailey—a woman who the police had 
also arrested when the drugs were found. Id. Burch said that he pleaded guilty because he was facing 
threats from Bailey, who said that she would incriminate him in her own deal with the government, 
and because he believed that a jury would be more likely to believe Bailey over him, given his status 
as a young Black man with a prior drug conviction. Id. 
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but stated that it still would enforce the waiver of FRE 410 and FRCP 11(e)(6) 
to admit his prior plea statements.223 Burch was convicted and sentenced to 
twelve and a half years in prison and five years of supervised release.224 
The D.C. Circuit decided that the reasoning underlying Mezzanatto was 
applicable beyond the scope of the specific question addressed therein, and 
held that waivers of FRE 410 and FRCP 11(f) are enforceable to admit evi-
dence for the prosecution’s case-in-chief.225 The court cited the three principles 
outlined in Mezzanatto: (1) that there is no evidence that Congress intended to 
prevent waivers; (2) that FRE 410, FRCP 11(e)(6), and the respective advisory 
committee notes do not recommend limitations on waivability; and (3) that 
there are no policy reasons that overcome the presumption of waivability.226 
The court acknowledged two counter-arguments against extending Mez-
zanatto to waivers allowing for the use of statements in the prosecution’s case-
in-chief.227 First, the defendant argued that, in enacting FRE 410 and FRCP 
11(e)(6), Congress impliedly expressed its intent to create unwaivable rights 
that protect the accused and benefit the judiciary.228 The D.C. Circuit disposed 
of this argument by noting that the Supreme Court already had deemed con-
gressional intent an insufficient basis to overcome the presumption of wai-
vability.229 Second, the court addressed a concern that allowing waivers for the 
use of plea statements in the government’s case-in-chief could discourage de-
fendants from participating in plea negotiations.230 The court concluded that it 
                                                                                                                           
 223 Id. The judge expressed skepticism at the defendant’s late claim of innocence, but nonetheless 
decided to give the defendant an opportunity to have a trial. Id. The court ruled that statements made 
during Burch’s plea hearing and in his conversations with the DEA could be used for the prosecu-
tion’s case-in-chief, whereas statements made during plea discussions could only be used for rebuttal 
or impeachment purposes. Id. 
 224 Id. Burch appealed the conviction. Id. at 1317. During the time that his direct appeal was 
pending, Burch filed a writ for habeas corpus with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and 
prosecutorial misconduct. Id. The court denied his petition and the defendant filed a petition for a 
certificate of appealability. Id. The court consolidated the direct appeal with that petition. Id. 
 225 Id. at 1320–21 (citing United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201–02, 208 n.5, 204–10 
(1995)). 
 226 Id. at 1321. 
 227 Id. 1321–22. 
 228 Id. at 1321. Although personal rights are traditionally waivable—because FRE 410 and FRCP 
11(e)(6) protect institutional interests by encouraging plea bargaining—they should not be waivable. 
Id. Personal rights include the right to testify on one’s own behalf, the right to plead guilty, the right to 
waive a jury trial, and the right to waive an appeal. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) 
(listing the personal rights that a defendant has over his or her case). The Fifth Circuit relied upon the 
analysis in Burch to evaluate a case-in-chief waiver. See United States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 291 
(5th Cir. 2009) (citing Burch, 156 F.3d at 1321–22) (agreeing with Burch that arguments relying on 
congressional intent to promote open plea discussions are not strong enough to justify the refusal to 
uphold case-in-chief waivers). 
 229 Burch, 156 F.3d at 1321. The Fifth Circuit also engaged with and disposed of this argument. 
Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 291. 
 230 Burch, 156 F.3d at 1322. 
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was unlikely that allowing the case-in-chief use of plea statements from a pre-
viously executed plea agreement would discourage defendants from entering 
plea discussions.231 Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit held that waivers allowing the 
introduction of plea statements in the government’s case-in-chief were valid.232 
Courts have since relied on Burch to justify the enforcement of case-in-chief 
waivers.233 
Although the majority of circuit courts have held case-in-chief waivers 
enforceable, legal commentators are critical of the practice.234 Some scholars 
have expressed skepticism that case-in-chief waivers have no more effect on a 
defendant’s participation in the plea bargaining system than impeachment 
waivers.235 Some have argued that a case-in-chief waiver is essentially a waiv-
er of the trial itself.236 Additionally, scholars believe that the vast difference 
between the consequences of signing a plea agreement with an impeachment 
waiver, versus a case-in-chief waiver, will almost certainly affect the plea-
bargaining process.237 Others have further noted that a judge’s failure to accept 
                                                                                                                           
 231 Id. The court highlighted that the waiver in question was enacted with the signing of the actual 
plea agreement, which had occurred after the plea discussions. Id. The court stated that this was dis-
tinguishable from waivers that defendants execute prior to plea negotiations. Id. The court, however, 
did not indicate whether it would enforce a waiver in an agreement that had been executed prior to 
plea discussions. Id. 
 232 Id. at 1321. 
 233 See, e.g., Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 289 (relying on the same rationale in Burch, which allowed the 
use of plea statements in the government’s case-in-chief). 
 234 See Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests That Judges Should Be 
Able to Participate in Plea Discussions, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1667, 1690 (2013) (noting that a judge’s 
decision not to accept a plea could trigger a case-in-chief waiver); Miller, supra note 184, at 437 (ar-
guing that defendants should be able to submit evidence of the rejection of a favorable plea with a 
valid FRE 410 waiver); Julia A. Keck, Note, United States v. Sylvester: The Expansion of the Waiver 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 to Allow Case-in-Chief Use of Plea Negotiation Statements, 84 TUL. 
L. REV. 1385, 1399 (2010) (contending that a case-in-chief waiver effectively replaces a trial); Adam 
Robison, Comment, Waiver of Plea Agreement Statements: A Glimmer of Hope to Limit Plea State-
ment Usage to Impeachment, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 674–75 (2005) (arguing that case-in-chief waiv-
ers will have a much greater effect on the plea-bargaining process than impeachment waivers). 
 235 Robison, supra note 234, at 674–75. These scholars reason that because defendants choose 
whether to testify at trial, they ultimately determine the admissibility of their own prior statements 
with an impeachment waiver. E.g., id. at 675. In contrast, in the case of rebuttal waivers, defendants 
are extremely limited in their defense strategy because any argument or testimony inconsistent with 
prior plea statements could trigger the admission of those statements. See Mueller, supra note 98, at 
1081 (stating that rebuttal waivers severely limit the defense’s strategy). 
 236 Keck, supra note 234, at 1399. Scholars also argue that, in addition to waiving the right to a 
trial, case-in-chief waivers also inadvertently undermine the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-
incrimination. Id. at 1402. 
 237 Robison, supra note 234, at 674–75. These commentators argue that, when defendants begin 
plea discussions that do not culminate in a final agreement, they make themselves vulnerable to the 
possibility of the government bringing a case against them without any evidence beyond the state-
ments made during plea bargaining. Keck, supra note 234, at 1399. This concern echoes Justice Sout-
er’s dissent in Mezzanatto. See 513 U.S. 196, 217 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that a case-in-
chief waiver is the effective waiver of a trial). 
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a guilty plea could result in the triggering of a case-in-chief waiver.238 Such 
scholars likewise point to the inherent unfairness that allows a defendant’s plea 
to be used against them, but does not allow the defendant to present evidence 
of a rejection of a favorable guilty plea.239 Despite the fact that courts are 
trending toward enforcing case-in-chief waivers, the majority of the legal 
community believes that such waivers pose a serious risk to the constitutional 
rights of criminal defendants.240 
III. THE CIRCUIT COURTS’ EXTENSION OF MEZZANATTO THREATENS 
DEFENDANTS’ RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
Defendants have a constitutional right to a fair trial.241 But extensions of 
the Supreme Court’s 1995 holding in United States v. Mezzanatto are threaten-
ing that right.242 The use of plea statements in the government’s case-in-chief 
or for rebuttal purposes ultimately defeats the purpose of going to trial.243 If 
the prosecution presents a defendant’s own incriminating statements, the jury 
is left with little doubt as to their guilt.244 The trial itself becomes a mere for-
mality rather than a meaningful exercise of a defendant’s constitutional 
right.245 This Part discusses the consequences of the circuit courts’ expansive 
readings of Mezzanatto, addresses the ethical implications for prosecutors 
raised by case-in-chief waivers, and suggests that these waivers can be voided 
as unjust using contract principles.246 Section A of this Part examines how 
case-in-chief and rebuttal waivers threaten the constitutional rights of criminal 
defendants.247 Section B argues that the use of case-in-chief waivers violates 
                                                                                                                           
 238 Miller, supra note 234, at 1690. 
 239 Miller, supra note 184, at 437. FRE 410 waivers are only enforceable against defendants, 
though the rationale in Mezzanatto is equally applicable. Id. 
 240 See Miller, supra note 234, at 1690 (stating that a judge’s failure to accept a plea triggers a 
case-in-chief waiver); see also Miller, supra note 184, at 433 (noting that most modern courts have 
upheld case-in-chief waivers); Keck, supra note 234, at 1399 (contending that a case-in-chief waiver 
waives the right to a trial); Robison, supra note 234, at 674–75 (asserting that case-in-chief waivers 
are more harmful to the plea-bargaining process than impeachment waivers). 
 241 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 242 See 513 U.S. at 217 (Souter, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that these waivers would 
eventually waive the entire trial); Keck, supra note 234, at 1399 (same). 
 243 See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 217 (Souter, J., dissenting) (predicting that lower courts will in-
terpret the majority’s decision expansively, thereby leading to the “waiver of trial itself”); Keck, supra 
note 234, at 1399 (arguing that a case-in-chief waiver makes it so that a prosecutor does not have to 
present any other evidence other than the defendant’s plea statements, which serve as a confession to 
the jury). 
 244 See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 217 (Souter, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about the effects 
of case-in-chief waivers). 
 245 See id. (expressing concern that the majority’s decision will result in the functional waiver of 
criminal trials). 
 246 See infra notes 250–318 and accompanying text. 
 247 See infra notes 250–270 and accompanying text. 
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the prosecutor’s ethical obligations.248 Section C reasons that courts should 
refuse to enforce case-in-chief and rebuttal waivers because they are contracts 
that are contrary to public policy.249 
A. Case-in-Chief and Rebuttal Waivers Threaten  
Defendants’ Right to a Fair Trial 
Circuit courts’ expansive readings of Mezzanatto threaten defendants’ 
constitutional right to a fair trial.250 Defendants arguing against the enforcea-
bility of FRE 410 and FRCP 11(f) case-in-chief waivers rightly have asserted 
that enforcing such waivers inhibits plea bargaining, thereby frustrating the 
clear congressional intent behind these rules.251 In 1998, in United States v. 
Burch, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals dismissed this tremendous 
policy concern by emphasizing a procedural technicality in the case—the de-
fendant had signed the waiver after engaging in plea discussions—without 
considering the implications of case-in-chief waivers generally.252 According 
to the court, the case-in-chief waiver in question did not discourage this partic-
ular defendant from entering a plea agreement because he already had entered 
plea discussions when he signed the agreement, including the waiver.253 Later 
courts, however, unfortunately have relied upon Burch as justification for en-
forcing case-in-chief waivers that are not signed after entering plea negotia-
tions.254 For example, the signing of proffer agreements is usually a prerequi-
site for entering a plea agreement, and the defendant will almost always sign 
the agreement before plea discussions begin.255 Courts in favor of an expansive 
reading of Mezzanatto focus on the “knowing and voluntary” nature of the 
                                                                                                                           
 248 See infra notes 271–286 and accompanying text. 
 249 See infra notes 287–318 and accompanying text. 
 250 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (establishing the right to a fair trial for criminal defendants); Unit-
ed States v. Rebbe, 314 F.3d 402, 408–09 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing the use of plea statements for 
rebuttal purposes); United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (expanding FRE 410 
waivers to allow evidence to be used in the prosecution’s case-in-chief); Mueller, supra note 98, at 
1081 (observing that rebuttal evidence is more threatening than impeachment evidence because the 
former severely limits a defendant’s defense strategy). 
 251 See Burch, 156 F.3d at 1322 (presenting the defendant’s argument that FRE 410 waivers frus-
trate Congress’s purpose for enacting the Rule). 
 252 See id. (enforcing a case-in-chief waiver without considering the implications on future cases). 
In Burch, the D.C. Circuit ultimately extended the Mezzanatto holding to allow statements to be used 
for the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Id. at 1321. 
 253 Id. at 1322. 
 254 See, e.g., United States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 2009) (relying on the ra-
tionale in Burch to allow for the use of plea statements in the government’s case-in-chief). 
 255 See Smith, supra note 197, at 810 (stating that criminal defendants usually sign proffer agree-
ments that contain FRE 410 waivers, before entering plea discussions); see also United States v. Ji-
ménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting that the defendant signed a proffer before en-
gaging in plea discussions). 
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agreement.256 In extending Mezzanatto outside its proper context, these courts 
fail to consider the vast differences in the results of impeachment waivers from 
those of case-in-chief waivers.257 Defendants trigger impeachment waivers 
only when they choose to testify, whereas they can activate case-in-chief waiv-
ers immediately if they breach the agreement.258 
Additionally, case-in-chief waivers likely will discourage defendants from 
entering plea discussions.259 The majority in Mezzanatto dismissed this con-
cern by reasoning that, although some defendants may be discouraged from 
participating in the plea-bargaining process, many prosecutors would not even 
engage in the process without a waiver clause.260 Circuit courts have adopted 
this rationale when enforcing case-in-chief waivers.261 The Mezzanatto Court 
failed to contemplate how public policy concerns could potentially supersede 
the presumptive validity of waivers, and also overlooked compelling justifica-
tions against waiver enforcement, namely preventing false convictions and 
protecting the integrity of the criminal justice system.262 As Justice Souter ob-
served in his dissent in Mezzanatto, the use of plea statements for the govern-
ment’s case-in-chief nullifies the need for a trial because the outcome is almost 
                                                                                                                           
 256 See United States v. Jim, 786 F.3d 802, 813 & n.6 (10th Cir. 2015) (expanding the rationale in 
Mezzanatto to case-in-chief waivers), aff’d, 804 F. App’x 895 (10th Cir. 2020); Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 
289 (same); United States v. Fifer, 206 F. App’x 502, 509–10 (6th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. 
Young, 223 F.3d 905, 911 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); Burch, 156 F.3d at 1321 (same). For example, the 
Tenth Circuit in United States v. Jim held that the defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary based 
on his age and education, his prior experience with guilty pleas, and the clear language used in the 
plea agreement. 786 F.3d at 813. At the time the agreement was signed, Jim was twenty-eight years 
old, had a high school diploma, and had some college credits. Id. He had previously pleaded guilty to 
two drunk driving charges. Id. The Tenth Circuit’s interpretation mistakenly read Mezzanatto as stat-
ing that the only ground for ignoring a waiver was if it was not knowing and voluntary, and ignored 
the fact that pleas can be withdrawn when it is “fair and just” to do so. See id. (considering exclusively 
whether Jim’s plea was knowing and voluntary); Mueller, supra note 98, 1049 (criticizing the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in Jim for ignoring fairness considerations). 
 257 See Robison, supra note 234, at 674–75 (stating that case-in-chief waivers have a much great-
er effect on the plea-bargaining process than impeachment waivers). 
 258 See Mueller, supra note 98, at 1081 (noting that impeachment waivers discourage defendants 
from testifying). 
 259 Robison, supra note 234, at 674–75. 
 260 See 513 U.S. 196, 207 (1995) (rejecting arguments that the enforcement of FRE 410 waivers 
for impeachment purposes would adversely affect the plea-bargaining process). 
 261 See Jim, 786 F.3d at 813 & n.6 (enforcing case-in-chief waivers); Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 289 
(same); Fifer, 206 F. App’x at 509–10 (same); Young, 223 F.3d at 911 (same); Burch, 156 F.3d at 
1321 (same). 
 262 See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 207 (declining to address the public policy implications of the 
presumptive validity of plea waivers); United States v. Jiménez-Bencevi, 788 F.3d 7, 17–18 (1st Cir. 
2015) (stating that defendants have incentives to plead guilty even when they are innocent); United 
States v. Newbert, 504 F.3d 180, 187–88 (1st Cir. 2007) (refusing to enforce a plea agreement where 
there was evidence of the defendant’s innocence); United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25–26 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (stating that plea agreements can be voided in the interests of justice). 
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certain.263 Thus, the failure among circuit courts to acknowledge the vast con-
textual difference between the implications of impeachment waivers and case-
in-chief waivers threatens the integrity of the criminal justice system and the 
constitutional rights of criminal defendants.264 
The enforcement of waivers that utilize plea statements for rebuttal purpos-
es produces nearly the same unjust outcome as case-in-chief waivers.265 When a 
waiver sanctions plea statements for rebuttal purposes, the prosecution can use 
those statements to refute any evidence presented at trial and, in doing so, signif-
icantly limit the defendant’s opportunity to establish a competent defense.266 
Although a defendant can choose not to testify, a rebuttal waiver allows the 
prosecution to rebut any evidence presented at trial, including any statements 
made by another witness or any arguments that the defendant’s attorney has put 
forth.267 Courts consistently have considered a defendant’s right to a competent 
defense to hinge solely on the aptitude of his or her attorney; however, rebuttal 
waivers severely handicap the strategy of even the most competent defense at-
torney.268 Thus, rebuttal waivers essentially rob criminal defendants of the right 
to a competent defense.269 Consequently, instead of continuing to stretch the im-
                                                                                                                           
 263 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 217 (Souter, J., dissenting); see Keck, supra note 234, at 1399 (noting 
that a case-in-chief waiver replaces a trial). 
 264 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (establishing the right to a fair trial); Jim, 786 F.3d at 813 & n.6 
(allowing a case-in-chief waiver after the defendant failed to prove that the plea was not knowing and 
involuntary); Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 289 (extending the holding in Mezzanatto to include case-in-chief 
waivers when the waiver at issue was entered knowingly and voluntarily and made in the presence of 
counsel); Fifer, 206 F. App’x at 509–10 (holding that counsel’s advisement that the defendant agree to 
a case-in-chief waiver did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel because the record failed to 
establish that defense counsel did not understand the significance of the waiver); Young, 223 F.3d at 
915 (allowing a case-in-chief waiver because the plea agreement was entered into voluntarily and the 
defendant received benefits, such as the prosecution’s promise not to seek a sentencing enhancement); 
Burch, 156 F.3d at 1321 (enforcing a case-in-chief waiver because it was knowing and voluntary, and 
because there was not a sufficient showing to establish ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 265 See, e.g., United States v. Rebbe, 314 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 2002) (limiting a defendant’s 
defense strategy); Mueller, supra note 98, at 1081 (stating that rebuttal waivers allow for the use of 
witnesses’ and attorneys’ statements that contradict the defendant’s prior plea statements). 
 266 See Rebbe, 314 F.3d at 408 (stating that the defendant could not present evidence nor argu-
ments that contradicted his plea statements). 
 267 See Mueller, supra note 98, at 1081 (stating that rebuttal waivers severely limit the defense’s 
strategy). 
 268 See Gilles, supra note 43, at 1385–86 (stating that courts consider the actions of a defendant’s 
attorney only when evaluating whether the defendant received a competent defense). Rebuttal and 
case-in-chief waivers may discourage defense attorneys from participating in plea discussions, which 
can be important opportunities for the defense to assess the prosecutor’s strategy and attitude. Mueller, 
supra note 98, at 1036. Once the waiver is enacted, the only tool available to the defense attorney is to 
stress the prosecution’s high burden of proof because any argument pertaining to “factual innocence” 
would trigger the waiver. Id. at 1048. 
 269 See Gilles, supra note 43, at 1386 (explaining that an inquiry into competent defense only 
looks to the defense attorney’s aptitude); Mueller, supra note 98, at 1036 (arguing that rebuttal waiv-
ers have a more substantial effect on the overall defense strategy than impeachment waivers). 
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plications of Mezzanatto, courts should enforce waivers to permit the admittance 
of plea statements solely for impeachment purposes.270 
B. Waiver Clauses and Prosecutorial Ethics 
Judges are not the only actors with the power and obligation to prevent 
injustices caused by case-in-chief and rebuttal waivers. Prosecutors are com-
monly referred to as “ministers of justice,” meaning that they must balance the 
law, the individual circumstances of each case, and the well-being of the public 
when deciding whether to bring charges.271 A prosecutor’s duty is not to win 
cases, but to serve ultimate justice, thus obligating them to prevent miscarriag-
es of justice and to avoid wrongful convictions while also working to achieve 
just convictions.272 Overall, U.S. Attorneys’ offices have lower caseloads and 
are better funded than their state counterparts.273 It is especially troubling, 
therefore, that without the excuse of crushing caseloads or scarce resources 
federal prosecutors routinely use FRE 410 waivers to make plea statements 
available for rebuttal purposes and for the prosecution’s case-in-chief.274 FRE 
410 waivers are likely to cause a miscarriage of justice, thereby violating the 
ethical duties of prosecutors.275 For example, in United States v. Newbert, evi-
dence of the defendant’s innocence came to light, and yet the prosecutor still 
                                                                                                                           
 270 See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 217 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (predicting 
that the majority’s opinion would be read expansively, leading to the invocation of case-in-chief 
waivers). Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, joined by Justices O’Connor and Breyer, expressed con-
cerns regarding case-in-chief waivers. Id. at 211 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Stevens joined 
Justice Souter’s dissent. Id. at 211–18 (Souter, J., dissenting). Thus, a five justice majority opposed 
the use of case-in-chief waivers. Mueller, supra note 98, at 1046. 
 271 Ross Galin, Note, Above the Law: The Prosecutor’s Duty to Seek Justice and the Performance 
of Substantial Assistance Agreements, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1264 (2000). 
 272 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (defining the role of federal prosecutors); 
Galin, supra note 271, at 1264–65 (quoting Berger, 295 U.S. at 88) (describing the unique role of a 
prosecutor). In Berger v. United States, the Court stated: 
The United States Attorney[’s] . . . interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win the case, but that justice shall be done . . . . It is as much his duty to refrain 
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one. 
295 U.S. at 88. 
 273 Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, Essay, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive 
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 278 (2011). 
 274 See United States v. Roberts, 660 F.3d 149, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2011) (allowing the prosecution 
to use the defendant’s statements that were made during plea negotiations for rebuttal purposes); Syl-
vester, 583 F.3d at 289 (allowing the use of plea statements for the government’s case-in-chief); Ger-
showitz & Killinger, supra note 273, at 278 (stating that federal prosecutors have more resources and 
lower caseloads than state prosecutors); Ware, supra note 92, at 168 (acknowledging that waivers 
have become commonplace in the criminal context). 
 275 See United States v. Newbert, 504 F.3d 180, 187–88 (1st Cir. 2007) (refusing to enforce a plea 
waiver after evidence of the defendant’s innocence became available); Galin, supra note 271, at 1264–
65 (stating that prosecutors have the duty to prevent a miscarriage of justice). 
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sought to invoke the waiver clause.276 If the court had enforced that waiver, a 
wrongful conviction likely would have been the outcome.277 The court in Unit-
ed States v. Jiménez-Bencevi also recognized that defendants have incentives to 
plead guilty for crimes they did not commit and, therefore, plea statements 
may not always be true.278 
Prosecutors include FRE 410 waivers in their standard plea bargain forms 
to discourage defendants from breaching their pleas and requiring a trial.279 
These waivers, however, further skew an already unbalanced process.280 Un-
like in a criminal trial, there is almost no oversight over the plea-bargaining 
process.281 There is no transcript or recording that courts can review for an 
abuse of discretion.282 Additionally, if a defendant who entered a plea agree-
ment with a case-in-chief waiver later withdraws their plea, the prosecution’s 
case already has been made for them.283 The prosecutor simply can read a de-
fendant’s confession or reveal the prior guilty plea and rest their case.284 
Therefore, although these waivers serve as time savers for prosecutors seeking 
to obtain convictions, they also raise tremendous public policy concerns that 
can outweigh this practical benefit.285 If prosecutors must rely on these waivers 
to win at trial, perhaps they should not be bringing the case at all.286 
C. Contractual Solutions for a Constitutional Problem 
Even if prosecutors insist on continuing to use these unethical waivers, con-
tract law permits courts to avoid enforcing agreements that are contrary to public 
policy.287 Given the adverse policy implications of FRE 410 and FRCP 11(f) 
                                                                                                                           
 276 504 F.3d at 184. 
 277 See id. at 188 (observing that a wrongful conviction was likely the outcome if the court chose 
to enforce the plea agreement); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. L. INST. 1981) 
(stating that contracts that violate public policy are unenforceable). 
 278 See 788 F.3d 7, 17–18 (1st Cir. 2015) (acknowledging that defendants have incentives to plead 
guilty when they are in fact innocent); Penrod, supra note 32, 1141 n.64 (same). 
 279 See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 216 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that 
prosecutors frequently include FRE 410 waivers in their standard form plea agreement contracts). 
 280 See Cross, supra note 88, at 140 (identifying the power discrepancy between prosecutors and 
criminal defendants). 
 281 McConkie, supra note 116, at 82. 
 282 Id. 
 283 See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 217 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that a case-in-chief waiver is 
the waiver of a trial); Keck, supra note 234, at 1399 (same). 
 284 Keck, supra note 234, at 1399. 
 285 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 22, at 1924 (stating that prosecutors are incentivized to engage 
in plea agreements to save the time and expense of trial). 
 286 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasizing that a duty of prosecutors is 
to prevent false convictions). 
 287 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (stating that con-
tracts that violate public policy are unenforceable). 
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waivers, courts should invoke contract principles to void these waivers.288 A con-
tract is void on public policy grounds if the policy justifications for voiding the 
contract clearly outweigh the reasons for enforcing it.289 The considerations 
when deciding if public policy justifications eclipse the reasons for enforcing a 
particular contract term are: (1) the legislature or judiciary’s support for the poli-
cy; (2) whether enforcement of that term would undermine the policy; (3) 
whether the agreement was a product of intentional misconduct; and (4) the nex-
us between that misconduct and the term.290 
There are two major policies that discourage the use of waivers for admis-
sion of plea statements for non-impeachment purposes: (1) promoting plea bar-
gaining; and (2) ensuring that defendants receive fair trials.291 Congress has 
made it clear that encouraging defendants to make plea bargains benefits the 
criminal justice system.292 The U.S. Constitution guarantees defendants the right 
to a fair trial.293 Although the Mezzanatto Court interpreted Congress’s silence 
on whether the rules could be waived as a presumption of waivability, there are 
strong reasons to believe that this interpretation inevitably frustrates Congress’s 
purpose for the rules.294 Enforcing waiver clauses that permit the use of plea 
statements in rebuttals and in the government’s cases-in-chief will discourage 
defendants from participating in plea discussions and will threaten defendants’ 
trial rights, thus, undermining Congress’s intent in creating FRE 410 and FRCP 
11(f).295 Although the Mezzanatto Court dismissed this argument as applied to 
impeachment waivers, it is unclear whether the Court would have done the same 
                                                                                                                           
 288 See United States v. Henry, 758 F.3d 427, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (asserting that contract princi-
ples govern plea agreements); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (stating that contracts 
that violate public policy are void). 
 289 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178. 
 290 Id. § 178(3). 
 291 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (ensuring the right to a fair trial); Mezzanatto I, 998 F.2d 1452, 
1455 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d, 513 U.S. 196 (1995) (noting Congress’s intention to promote plea bar-
gaining). 
 292 Act of Dec. 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-149, 89 Stat. 805 (1975) (modifying FRE 410, which 
previously allowed for the admission of plea statements for impeachment purposes); FED. R. EVID. 
410 (1974) (permitting statements to be used for impeachment); H.R. REP. NO. 94-414, at 10 (1975) 
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 713, 714 (declining to allow for an impeachment excep-
tion to FRE 410); S. REP. NO. 99-1277, at 10 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7057 
(same). 
 293 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 294 See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 203–04 (stating that the presumption of waivability does not 
undermine Congress’s intention behind enacting FRE 410). 
 295 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (establishing the right to a fair trial); Mezzanatto I, 998 F.2d at 
1455 (noting that the enforcement of FRE 410 waivers will discourage criminal defendants from en-
tering plea agreements). Impeachment waivers are not as threatening to the plea-bargaining process 
because defendants can avoid being impeached by simply choosing not to testify. Robison, supra note 
234, at 674–75. Because most defendants are represented by competent counsel in plea discussions, 
attorneys may urge their clients not to participate in order to assure that their statements cannot be 
used in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Id. at 675. 
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in the case of a rebuttal or case-in-chief waiver.296 As more courts enforce case-
in-chief and rebuttal waivers, criminal defendants and their attorneys may grasp 
the enormous cost of engaging in plea discussions—which may or may not re-
sult in a deal—and opt not to participate.297 Evidence of intentional wrongdoing 
is also unlikely in the drafting of plea agreements, and thus it is improbable that 
courts would hold these agreements to be unenforceable for such a reason.298 
Ultimately, given that the policy concerns clearly outweigh the benefits of en-
forcing these waiver terms, courts should hold these types of waivers to be unen-
forceable.299 
In addition to being supported by public policy, this shift would also be fea-
sible because the rest of the plea agreement could still be salvaged.300 It is not 
unprecedented for judges to refuse to enforce a single clause in a plea agree-
ment.301 In United States v. Teeter, in spite of the contractual validity of the 
waiver clause at issue, the First Circuit chose, in the interests of justice, not to 
enforce a waiver of the right to appeal.302 Similarly, that same court, in Newbert, 
refused to enforce an otherwise valid FRE 410 waiver because there was evi-
dence that the defendant was actually innocent.303 Although the First Circuit did 
not outright state that plea agreements are adhesion contracts and should there-
fore be read more critically, its rationale embodies this idea.304 The court 
acknowledged that it should interpret ambiguities against the government as the 
drafter of the contract.305 It also noted that defendants are in a weaker bargaining 
                                                                                                                           
 296 See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 207 (suggesting that policy justifications could overcome the 
presumption of waivability in the context of impeachment waivers). 
 297 See id. at 217 (Souter, J., dissenting) (implying that case-in-chief waivers would discourage 
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 298 See id. at 207 (majority opinion) (stating that because prosecutors have limited resources and 
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protect their time and resources). 
 299 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (stating that a con-
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 300 See Jak Prods., Inc. v. Wiza, 986 F.2d 1080, 1087 (7th Cir. 1993) (modifying a non-competition 
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 301 United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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the waiver clause from the defendant’s plea agreement. Id. at 31. 
 303 See 504 F.3d 180, 187–88 (1st Cir. 2007) (declining to enforce a plea agreement after evi-
dence of the defendant’s innocence arose); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (stating 
that contracts that violate public policy are unenforceable). 
 304 See Newbert, 504 F.3d at 188 (stating that there is an imbalance of power between the parties, 
given that the government is the drafting party); Schwartz, supra note 77, at 347–48 (asserting that 
courts are more likely to reform adhesion contracts compared to other types of contracts). 
 305 See Newbert, 504 F.3d at 188 (acknowledging that the government is the drafting party and 
thus any ambiguity should be construed against them); Schwartz, supra note 77, at 346 (stating that 
the stronger party is often the drafter of a contract of adhesion). 
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position because their freedom is at stake.306 The First Circuit upheld the district 
court’s decision to reform the contract between the defendant and the govern-
ment, thereby voiding the waiver clause.307 The First Circuit reached its decision 
in spite of the facts that the agreement clearly stated that the defendant could not 
withdraw his guilty plea, both parties had signed the agreement voluntarily, and 
nothing in the agreement suggested that it was invalid.308 Notably, the agree-
ment’s resemblance to a contract of adhesion might have influenced the court to 
intervene.309 
Courts should consider the extreme imbalance of power between prosecu-
tors and criminal defendants, as well as the adhesive nature of plea agreements 
when evaluating their enforceability.310 If the terms of the agreement are clearly 
unfair to the criminal defendant, courts should refuse to enforce these uncon-
scionable agreements.311 Additionally, there are strong public policy reasons for 
not enforcing a contract where there is a likelihood that the defendant is actually 
innocent.312 Given that the goal of the criminal justice system is to seek the truth, 
enforcing an agreement that punishes the wrong person when there is evidence 
to support his or her innocence clearly violates public policy, and judges must 
hold such contracts unenforceable.313 Courts should follow the examples set 
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 311 See THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Spradlin, 532 F. App’x 813, 818 (10th Cir. 2013) 
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 312 See Newbert, 504 F.3d at 187–88 (refusing to enforce a plea agreement where there was evi-
dence of the defendant’s innocence); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (stating that 
contracts that violate public policy are unenforceable). 
 313 See Newbert, 504 F.3d at 187–88 (declining to enforce a plea agreement where there was 
evidence of the defendant’s innocence); N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 
2001) (stating that the purpose of the criminal justice system is to seek the truth); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (stating contracts that violate public policy are unenforceable). 
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forth in Newbert and Teeter, and refuse to enforce plea agreements with waivers 
of FRE 410 and FRCP 11(f) when the court believes that enforcement of those 
agreements will run counter to the interests of justice.314 Courts should consider 
fairness, rather than automatically enforcing plea agreements that a defendant 
has entered “knowingly and voluntarily.”315 For example, in cases where the 
court allows a defendant to withdraw a plea, the court should also be able to void 
the waiver clause even though the defendant technically breached his or her plea 
agreement.316 The court should not interpret said plea withdrawal as a breach or, 
at the very least, should not allow the withdrawal to trigger the admission of plea 
statements.317 In the context of plea agreements, in which a criminal defendant’s 
freedom is at stake, courts should not hesitate to employ the foundational princi-
ples of contract law that were developed to protect weaker bargaining parties.318 
CONCLUSION 
Circuit courts’ expansive interpretations of United States v. Mezzanatto 
pose risks to the rights of criminal defendants, as well as the functionality of the 
criminal justice system. The enforcement of FRE 410 and FRCP 11(f) waivers, 
which allow for the use of plea statements for rebuttal purposes or the prosecu-
tion’s case-in-chief, discourages plea bargaining and threatens a defendant’s 
right to a fair trial. As a result, courts should apply contract principles to plea 
agreements that contain these types of waivers, and should hold them to be un-
enforceable and void for public policy reasons. Furthermore, courts should strike 
these clauses from plea agreements when they threaten the sacred trial rights of 
criminal defendants. Courts also should not hesitate to intervene in these agree-
ments because they are essentially adhesion contracts, and are thus more likely 
to be unconscionable. Finally, these waivers violate prosecutorial ethics because 
they do not promote justice and are likely to result in wrongful convictions. 
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